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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to convince Air Force leadership to shift its approach to 
expeditionary airpower in counterinsurgency (COIN) from one that emphasizes advanced 
technology for striking targets to one that focuses on airmen to influence indigenous 
populations.  Judging history, airpower will certainly play a supporting role in any effort 
to quell insurgency through reconnaissance, airlift, and close air support.  Thus, wherever 
the American military deploys for COIN, the Air Force will not only operate, but will 
also deploy substantial numbers of expeditionary airmen.  This forward presence of 
American airmen at expeditionary airbases enables the Air Force to participate in 
pacification where it most counts—on the ground, in the surrounding community, and 
among the indigenous population.  To contribute more fully, airmen must comprehend 
the nature of insurgency to reveal the unique challenges it poses for airpower.  To meet 
these challenges, airmen must develop an appropriate strategic framework for waging 
COIN so as to correctly shape the expeditionary Air Force by exploiting its own human 
capital to solve human problems.  By bolstering its aviation advisors and security forces, 
and creating its own cadre of civil affairs airmen, the Air Force can most significantly 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RELEVANCE  
In the twenty-first century, insurgency will likely pose a significant challenge to 
the American military, and therefore, to expeditionary airpower.  To prepare more fully 
for this type of conflict, the Air Force must comprehend the nature of insurgent warfare 
to see not only the limitations of traditional conceptions of airpower, but to reveal the 
opportunities afforded airmen to more effectively meet the insurgents’ challenge.  While 
continuing to develop and employ advanced aerospace systems to achieve desired effects 
throughout the battlespace, the Air Force must increasingly leverage the inherent 
strengths of its own airmen to achieve truly decisive effects within local populations rife 
with insurgency.  To accomplish this feat, the expeditionary Air Force must reshape itself 
to participate more effectively in classic pacification campaigns. 
Insurgency is neither a new nor radical form of warfare, but rather one which 
seemingly dominates the present geo-political landscape.  In the first four decades 
following World War II, the United States waged the so called “proxy wars” against 
communist insurgents in Greece, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Nicaragua, to name 
only the most prominent.  Then, with the collapse of Soviet communism and the 
American-led victory in the first Gulf War, a different brand of insurgent arose to 
challenge the new world order.  Be they tribal warlords, narcotics barons, ethno-
nationalists, or Islamic jihadists, insurgents took up arms against established governments 
around the globe.  As the lone superpower and de facto world cop, the United States 
increasingly stepped into the fray to restore security and stability while attempting to 
limit the human toll.  Consequently, the American military progressively deployed to 
suppress what Carl von Clausewitz once called the “fire in… [the] heather.”1  To the 
degree that airpower played a role, either directly or in support, the Air Force found itself 
                                                 
1 In Graham’s translation of On War, Clausewitz explains the spread of insurgency and the insurgents’ 
challenge to conventional forces in the following way.  “Where no enemy is to be found, there is no want 
of courage to oppose him, and at the example thus given, the mass of the neighboring population gradually 
takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and reaching at last that part of the surface of the soil 
on which the aggressor is based, it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by 
which his existence is supported.”  See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, J.J. Graham, trans. and ed. (London: 
N. Trubner, 1873), online at http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/On_War/BK6ch26.html, accessed 20 
July 2006. 
2 
engaged in every one of these conflicts.  Now, in places as diverse as Columbia, the 
Balkans, the Philippines, Afghanistan, the horn of Africa, and Iraq, the legions of “Pax 
Americana” continue to face off against insurgents of one flavor or another.2  Given this 
frequency of insurgency and the demonstrated willingness of American leadership to 
check its threat to democracy and globalization, the United States military will almost 
certainly wage counterinsurgency (COIN) in the decades ahead. 
Given this reality, it can be fairly argued that the Air Force will almost certainly 
deploy expeditionary airmen as part of any American effort to suppress insurgency.  
Judging the history of warfare since the introduction of the aircraft almost a century ago, 
airpower has played and will almost certainly continue to play some role in any COIN 
effort.  Although it typically supports ground forces operating in the contested territory, 
the need for overhead sensors, aerial supply, air transport, and on-call precision firepower 
will demand airpower’s active participation.3  While the other Services no doubt possess 
substantial airpower capabilities of their own, particularly with respect to attack aviation, 
air mobility, and aeromedical evacuation, these capabilities are largely limited to 
battlefield and some intra-theater operations due to a reliance on mostly helicopters and 
fighter aircraft to perform those missions.  For the vast majority of fighter operations, 
persistent attack and sustained presence are only possible due to the air refueling 
provided by Air Force tankers.  As for air mobility and aeromedical evacuation, nearly all 
of the inter-theater capability, and the overwhelming majority of the intra-theater 
capability comes from the Air Force, with its substantial fleet of large cargo aircraft.  And 
with its ever-expanding fleet of remotely piloted aircraft, the Air Force also provides the 
majority of aerial reconnaissance for most battlefield commanders.  Since nearly all of 
                                                 
2 An explicit comparison to the ancient Roman Empire known as Pax Romana, Boot selects these 
words  to justify the extensive deployment of American military forces around the globe for imperial 
policing to defend its “empire of liberty.”  See Max Boot , The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the 
Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 336-352. 
3 Airpower has played a role in fighting insurgents since Brigadier General John J. Pershing led the 
Mexican Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916.  Early forays by airpower against insurgents 
included the Marine interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua during the interwar 
years, as well as the numerous colonial wars of the European powers in the Middle East and North Africa.  
After World War II, airpower was employed against communist insurgents in the Greek Civil War, the 
Philippine Huk Rebellion, the Malaya Emergency, the French Indochina War, the war in South Vietnam, 
and numerous other insurgencies across Southern Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.  See James 
S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence, 
KA: University of Kansas Press, 2003). 
3 
the air mobility and aeromedical missions must either launch or recover from within the 
area of operations, the Air Force must deploy expeditionary airmen into the contested 
territory to support these operations.  Furthermore, to the degree that fighters, tankers, 
and remotely piloted aircraft are forward based to increase operational efficiency, 
additional expeditionary airmen must deploy forward into theater.   Thus, as the argument 
goes, wherever the American military deploys for COIN, the Air Force will not only 
assuredly operate, but will also deploy substantial numbers of expeditionary airmen. 
While the deployment of numerous American airmen into the contested zone may 
represent a potential Achilles’ heel due to the increased need for force protection, viewed 
another way, it presents a unique opportunity for the Air Force to become a much more 
potent force in thwarting insurgency.  To the degree that the Air Force deploys highly 
trained airmen into the contested territory to conduct air operations, it will construct, as 
necessary, but will definitely operate and maintain one or more expeditionary airbases.  
To enable and sustain efficient air operations, each airbase will necessarily consist of a 
runway environment, command and control installations, logistical support facilities, 
barracks, and supporting infrastructure.  As a portal into the theater, each airbase will 
likely serve as a hub of American activity, supporting not only the Air Force, but also the 
operations of other Services, the interagency, and various non-governmental 
organizations.  Combined with the presence of high value aircraft and a relatively dense 
population of American airmen, among others, each expeditionary airbase will represent 
an operational center of gravity for the American forces conducting COIN.  Assuming 
that the insurgents will not control all of the territory to the same degree, planners could 
mitigate risks by establishing these airbases in regions of the state’s territory less 
contested by the insurgents.  Nonetheless, the relatively large American footprint of any 
expeditionary airbase within the contested territory represents a blade which cuts two 
ways.  On the one hand, the airbase presents a lucrative target for insurgent activity, 
therefore requiring substantial effort to establish and maintain security and stability 
within a sphere of influence to at least the range of indirect fire systems.4  On the other 
hand, the substantial forward presence of American airmen within that sphere could 
                                                 
4 David T. Young, Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Airbase Defense: A New Doctrinal 
Framework, Published thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, September 2005, 2-3. 
4 
enable the Air Force to exert significant influence on the overall pacification campaign 
where it most counts—on the ground, in the surrounding community, and among the 
indigenous population.   
Despite this apparent opportunity for airmen to more directly contribute to 
suppressing insurgency, and the other more traditional contributions of airpower to 
COIN, albeit in mostly supporting roles, the Air Force continues to struggle with how to 
define its rightful niche in defeating the insurgents.  Failing to fully understand the nature 
of insurgent warfare, the probability of its occurrence, and the unique challenges it 
presents to airmen constrained by their own limited viewpoint of what airpower is and is 
not, the Air Force continues to demonstrate its pure preference for developing 
technological solutions to what are inherently political problems requiring human 
solutions.  Consequently, the Air Force has neglected to develop its own human resources 
into the combat capabilities which if deployed would most significantly contribute to 
quelling insurgency.  To date, the preponderance of Air Force effort for COIN has 
focused on improving aerospace technology for the application of airpower on target.  
While these innovations, no doubt, have improved airpower’s distinctive capabilities for 
information superiority, rapid mobility, and precision attack, the focus on aerospace 
systems rather than airmen has prevented the Air Force from realizing its fullest potential 
to counter insurgents.   More significantly, this inappropriate approach has relegated the 
Air Force to a mostly supporting role – taking pictures, transporting troops, air dropping 
supplies, and expending ordnance as directed by others with an intellectual stake in the 
fight.   
To maintain its relevance in an era of increasing insurgent warfare, the Air Force 
must leverage the inherent strengths of its own airmen to exert influence over the local 
population within a sphere of influence around each expeditionary airbase.  By focusing 
on the development and employment of aviation advisors, security forces, civil affairs 
airmen, and the senior leaders who will command them, the Air Force can better shape its 
expeditionary air forces today to actively participate in classic pacification campaigns 
tomorrow.  By becoming a full partner in any pacification effort, the Air Force can assure 
its continued relevance in the predominant game of the twenty-first century.  More 
importantly, by developing its airmen to thwart insurgency, the Air Force need not 
5 
abandon the continued development of advanced aerospace systems optimized to defeat a 
peer competitor in conventional combat where mobility and firepower still reign 
supreme, and airpower arguably has become the dominant force. 
B. PURPOSE 
This study will attempt to convince senior Air Force leadership to shift its 
approach to expeditionary airpower in COIN from one that emphasizes technology and 
targets to one which focuses on airmen and indigenous populations.  Ever faithful to its 
own target-centric approach to warfare, the Air Force has focused most of its efforts for 
defeating insurgency on developing advanced aerospace systems and updated concepts of 
operation to improve traditional airpower capabilities for command and control, 
surveillance, intelligence, mobility, and precision attack.5  Now, readily accepting 
airpower’s mostly supporting role in quelling insurgency, the Air Force has willingly 
relegated itself to a “help desk” mentality.6  Often, with too little regard for the 
                                                 
5 In testimony before the U.S. Senate, Air Force leadership demonstrated the airmen’s pure preference 
for technology-to-warfighting.  Focusing investments on combinations of systems to create distinctive 
capabilities in support of the Joint warfighter, Secretary Roche and General Jumper unveiled six new 
concepts of operation, or CONOPS, to help identify the capabilities an expeditionary force would need to 
accomplish its mission.   Of these, the following four directly pertain to counterinsurgency. 
• Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CONOPS (Space and C4ISR) harnesses the integration 
of manned, unmanned, and space systems to provide persistent situation awareness and 
executable decision-quality information to the JFC.  
• Global Mobility CONOPS provides Combatant Commanders with the planning, 
command and control, and operations capabilities to enable timely and effective projection, 
employment, and sustainment of U.S. power in support of U.S. global interests -- precision 
delivery for operational effect.  
• Global Strike CONOPS employs joint power-projection capabilities to engage anti-
access and high-value targets, gain access to denied battlespace, and maintain battlespace 
access for required joint/coalition follow-on operations.  
• Global Persistent Attack CONOPS provides a spectrum of capabilities from major 
combat to peacekeeping and sustainment operations. Global Persistent Attack assumes that 
once access conditions are established (i.e. through Global Strike), there will be a need for 
persistent and sustained operations to maintain air, space, and information dominance. 
Judging the names of the CONOPS themselves and the amplifying language associated with each, it is 
fairly clear that the Air Force persists in prosecuting its own target-centric approach to warfare by applying 
technology to precisely deliver operational effects on specific targets.  See Honorable James G. Roche, 
Secretary of the Air Force, and General John P. Jumper, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Testimony before 
U.S. Senate Defense Subcomittee Hearing on the FY05 Air Force Budget, 24 March 2004, online at 
http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id =219554, accessed 5 July 2006. 
6 U.S. Air Force Checkmate and U.S. Navy Deep Blue, Vantage Points: The Use of Air & Space 
Power in Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism, Proceeding of the 2005 Air and Space 
Power Strategy Conference, 22-25 March 2005, v. 
6 
indigenous population, or the social grievances which underwrite insurgency, many 
airmen continue to demonstrate their penchant for applying kinetic solutions in the 
absence of any strategic context, or put another way, delivering information, material, 
and firepower from one location to another as requested by other warfighters with a more 
vested interest in the fight.  If the Air Force hopes to reverse this trend and reach its 
fullest potential for countering insurgents, it must get its head in the game by first seeking 
to understand the true nature of insurgent warfare, and then shaping a new approach for 
employing expeditionary airpower to suppress insurgency. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This study will propose an argument for making the Air Force more relevant to 
the geo-political situation of the twenty-first century by shaping expeditionary airpower 
for greater effectiveness in COIN.  To develop and support the argument, it will 
sequentially answer six research questions. 
1. Argument 
By comprehending the complex nature of insurgency, and then correctly 
emphasizing the capabilities of its airmen to solve human problems and influence 
indigenous local populations as aviation advisors, security forces, and civil affairs 
airmen, the expeditionary Air Force can significantly improve its effectiveness in COIN, 
thereby increasing its contribution to classic pacification efforts, and ultimately assuring 
its continued relevance in an era of insurgent warfare. 
2. Research Questions 
• What is the insurgents’ way of war, and what fundamental challenges does 
it pose for modern airmen? 
• What is the airman’s approach to warfare, and what strategic mindset does 
it produce that hinders expeditionary airpower in COIN? 
• What conceptual framework can airmen use to understand insurgent 
warfare? 
• Given the conceptual framework for COIN, how should airmen think 
about influence in a classic pacification campaign? 
7 
• How can the Air Force leverage its airmen to improve expeditionary 
airpower so as to render it more effective and relevant in COIN? 
• How does an improved expeditionary Air Force contribute to a classic 
pacification campaign, and what benefits are accrued by its participation? 
D. SCOPE 
1. Insurgent Warfare 
This study deals with the particular subset of human warfare waged by the 
insurgent vis-à-vis the state.  Thus, it must address the actions of the insurgent, and the 
counteractions of the state.  Since the actions of the insurgent amount to insurgency, and 
those of the state to counterinsurgency, the definitions of each present a logical starting 
point.  Defined in terms of those who challenge the state, insurgency is an organized 
attempt to overthrow an established government through subversion and armed conflict.7  
Juxtaposed against this, counterinsurgency consists of “those military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by the government to defeat 
insurgency.”8  Given these two definitions then, insurgent warfare is, in its essence, a 
power struggle between insurgents and the state using nearly any means available. 
In contrast to the rather direct term of “insurgent warfare,” numerous academics 
and practitioners have used various other more ambiguous terms to label this particular 
subset of warfare over the years, including small wars, low intensity conflict, military 
operations other than war, fourth generation warfare, and of late, irregular warfare.  
While various reasons for these sorted delineations abound, their broad characterizations 
and subtle differences in context have ultimately served to obfuscate its essential traits.  
In the attempt to eliminate confusion and to call things what they really are, this study 
will hereafter only refer to the subject as insurgent warfare, or as either insurgency or 
counterinsurgency, depending on the perspective.  Before moving on, however, the 
reader deserves a brief explanation as to why the other previously used terms for this type 
of warfare will not be used in this study. 
                                                 
7 Joint Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 264, online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, 
accessed 20 July 2006. 
8 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 127. 
8 
Coined by Colonel C.E. Callwell, the famed British practitioner of imperial 
warfare, the term “small war” originally denoted the operations of regular military forces 
against irregular forces to suppress rebellion and guerrilla warfare with admittedly no 
connection to the scale of military operations being carried out.9  Later, the Marines used 
the term to describe operations where military force combined with diplomatic pressure 
to influence the affairs of another state whose unstable government required American 
intervention.10  Regardless of definition, however, the term “small war” proves 
problematic for at least two reasons.  First, it is simply inappropriate since “small” does 
denote a lack of scale.  This inaccurate connotation not only can prove perilous to the less 
informed who might encounter the term, but the matter of scale is purely relative, for the 
state’s small war of limited aims likely represents the rebel’s total war for basic survival.  
Second, while the Marines’ definition does hint at the basic characteristic of violent 
political conflict, the focus of Callwell’s definition on who is fighting rather than on the 
nature of the conflict being fought inappropriately drives many who use the term to focus 
on tactical matters of dealing with irregulars rather than the political issues which 
underwrite the rebellion. 
As for the term “low intensity conflict,” or LIC, its use became widespread during 
the last decade of the Cold War when it was eventually codified into Service doctrine.  
Defined in terms of a spectrum of conflict, LIC represents the entire lower end of the 
scale, or all “political-military operations between contending states or groups below 
conventional war and above… peaceful competition.”11  Although the complete doctrinal 
definition does provide some amplification, as Colonel Dennis Drew emphatically points 
out, LIC is an entirely inappropriate title for a type of warfare that consumes so many 
nations in violent, political struggle.12  As with small war, the very relative connotation 
implied by the title itself proves more misleading than descriptive. 
                                                 
9 C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd Ed. (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 
1996), 21. 
10 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 1. 
11 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-20, and U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 3-20, Military Operations 
in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), online at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020ch1.htm#s_9, accessed 20 July 
2006. 
12 Dennis M. Drew, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: American Dilemmas and Doctrinal 
Proposals (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 3. 
9 
Regarding “military operations other than war,” or MOOTW, current Joint and 
Air Force doctrine apply this moniker to COIN.  Without debating the precise definition 
of war, the discussion of insurgent warfare under MOOTW seems to imply that COIN 
does not rise to the level of war.  This presents a major problem for the entire Department 
of Defense, where the existential reason for doctrine as articulated by a former Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to position the Services for “success in fighting our Nation’s 
wars.”13  However, since COIN apparently does not rise to the level of war, which of 
itself represents the military’s raison d’etre, the Services willingly relegate COIN to the 
backwaters of MOOTW, thereby fulfilling David Tucker’s astute observation that 
organizations with a strong mission give perfunctory attention, if any at all, to tasks that 
are not central to that mission.14  For this reason alone, MOOTW should not be used to 
categorize insurgent warfare.  In fact, RAND’s recent recommendation that COIN be 
made an institutional priority of the Air Force seems to repudiate this categorization 
altogether.15 
With the rise of network-centric operations, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes defines 
“fourth generation warfare,” or 4GW, as using “all available networks—political, 
economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that 
their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”16  
While this definition seems to aptly describe how many insurgents currently operate, as 
Hammes himself argues, it should just as aptly describe how military forces in any type 
of conflict operate.  The point is that 4GW does not represent a particular type of warfare 
based on the nature of the conflict, but rather an evolution in the ways of waging war, 
largely enabled by the information age.  Failing to allude to the underlying struggle for 
legitimate power that is insurgent warfare, 4GW represents too broad of a categorization  
 
                                                 
13 Henry E. Shelton, Letter of Introduction, See Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the 
Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000). 
14 David C. Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United State and International Terrorism, 
(Westport: Praeger, 1997), 114. 
15 Alan Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Karl Mueller, Air Power in the New 
Era of Counterinsurgency: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions, 
Restricted Draft (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 145. 
16 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith 
Press, 2004), 2. 
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for insurgent warfare, not to mention that its descriptive qualities are limited to the notion 
that 4GW is just one more evolution of warfare following three previous ones—which in 
and of itself is open to further debate. 
As for “irregular warfare,” or IR, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 
uses the term as a general category of warfare to include insurgency and terrorism.  
Defined as “operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-
state,” IR fails to pass muster for the same reason that Callwell’s definition of small war 
fails.17  By referring to the type of enemy combatants rather than to the nature of the 
conflict between the opposing sides, IR leads those who use the term to focus on tactics 
to defeat irregular forces rather than strategies to quell insurgency.  In the same regard, 
since both guerrilla warfare and terrorism also represent mere tactics, neither should be 
used as a substitute for insurgent warfare.  Finally, the now emerging use of “intrastate 
warfare” also proves less than adequate since it attempts to confine all insurgency to a 
realm solely within the state.  Not only does this fly in the face of the global Islamist 
insurgency now troubling much of the West, but it also denies numerous cases of 
insurgents originating from outside a state and operating across its borders. 
2. Expeditionary Air Force  
This study will confine its prognostication for expeditionary airpower in COIN to 
the Air Force.  Although the other three Services and many coalition militaries also 
contribute to airpower in significant ways, the Air Force possesses such well-trained and 
equipped air forces that it arguably dominates the aerospace medium in the context of its 
own core competencies.18  Despite this dominance, however, the widely held viewpoint 
that airpower generally plays a supporting role in COIN has led many in the Air Force to 
resign themselves to prowling the sidelines during insurgent warfare, content to satisfy 
the air support requests of others with little to no participation in the development and 
                                                 
17 Donald S. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2006), 11. 
18 Air Force core competencies include air and space superiority, precision engagement, global attack, 
rapid global mobility, information superiority, and agile combat support.  While it could be fairly argued 
that the Air Force no longer dominates each of these all of the time, particularly precision engagement and 
information superiority, it could be just as fairly argued that the Air Force still dominates the majority most 
of the time.  See U.S. Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 27-28. 
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execution of strategy.19  This lack of initiative has not only produced a vacuum of 
strategic thought within the Air Force as regards COIN, but it has also slowed the pace of 
institutional evolution that might render the Air Force more effective in this type of 
warfare.  As for the meaning of words, “airpower” will refer to the combined air and 
space power of the Air Force, while “airman,” in all of its forms, will refer to any Air 
Force personnel who in one capacity or another, either directly or indirectly, help bring 
that airpower to bear in peace or war.   
3. Beyond Traditional Airpower 
Of note, this work will part ways with many earlier analyses of airpower in COIN 
by increasing the aperture of its lens to look beyond the traditional roles and missions of 
airpower.  Rather than providing yet another assessment of how advanced aerospace 
systems can best support COIN from above the earth, this work hopes to shed light on the 
critical contributions of those airmen working at ground level, whose efforts truly enable 
expeditionary airpower to operate more effectively, and with greater relevance to 
thwarting insurgency.  Specifically, this study will argue that the Air Force can achieve 
its greatest potential to suppress insurgency by appropriately emphasizing the operations 
of those Air Force personnel who could most directly contribute to the successful 
execution of a classic pacification campaign—aviation advisors, security forces, and civil 
affairs airmen. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II defines the problem that insurgency poses for airpower by answering 
the first and second research questions, in turn.  Initially, through an exploration into the 
insurgents’ way of war, the chapter uncovers some of the principal challenges which 
insurgency presents to modern airmen.  Then, through several characterizations of the 
airman’s approach to warfare, a strategic mindset emerges to reveal why airmen too often 
rely on the use of coercive power to achieve the nation’s goals.  Finally, the chapter 
demonstrates how this reliance on coercive strategy contributes to airpower landing short 
when faced with the insurgents’ challenge.  
With the problem so defined, Chapter III frames a plausible solution for airpower 
in COIN by addressing the next two research questions.  In answering the third, the 
                                                 
19 Checkmate and Deep Blue, v. 
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chapter lays out a conceptual framework for airmen to understand the interplay between 
insurgents and the state.  Then, moving on to the fourth research question, the chapter 
attempts to expand the airman’s toolbox by outlining a strategic portfolio of influences 
for application to COIN.  Finally, the chapter explains how the state mechanizes its 
strategy for quelling insurgency through a classic pacification campaign. 
With the solution thus framed, Chapter IV addresses the fifth research question by 
delivering concrete approaches for expeditionary airpower to apply in accordance with 
the framework.  By demonstrating, in turn, how the operations of aviation advisors, 
security forces, and civil affairs airmen help address the fundamental challenges facing 
airmen during insurgent warfare, the chapter elaborates how the Air Force can leverage 
the unique capabilities of its highly trained airmen to execute COIN for far greater effect. 
Finally, Chapter V responds to the last research question by demonstrating how 
the operations of aviation advisors, security forces, and civil affairs airmen contribute to 
overall success in a classic pacification campaign.  Under the command of a senior Air 
Force leader serving as the designated ground commander for a zone around the 
expeditionary airbase, these airmen not only secure and stabilize that zone as part of a 
larger effort to pacify the entire contested territory, but they sow the seeds which reap 
additional benefits for the American military far beyond the current insurgency.   
F. PRIMARY BENEFITS 
The primary benefits of this study are threefold.  First, in a general sense, another 
introspective examination of American airpower in insurgent warfare should reveal new 
insights into COIN from the airman’s perspective.  In turn, this can only help to increase 
the general level of understanding with respect to insurgent warfare.  Second, by applying 
the insurgent’s perspective to view airpower at the ground level, this work hopes to 
reveal opportunities for innovation in expeditionary airpower that will make the Air 
Force more effective in COIN and more relevant to the projected strategic situation.  
Finally, by demonstrating how the expeditionary Air Force can significantly contribute to 
a classic pacification campaign, this study should provide planners with better ways to 
employ the military instrument for strategic purpose in an era of insurgent warfare. 
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM  
Before attempting to answer any question, one must first define the problem in 
need of a solution.  In the case of airpower in insurgent warfare, this process consists of 
three essential steps.  First, the insurgents’ way of war must be dissected to uncover the 
characteristics which make insurgent warfare so unique as compared to those wars waged 
by conventional military forces.  Armed with this understanding, a comprehensive 
definition of insurgent warfare may be developed to help reveal the critical challenges 
which insurgency presents to modern airmen.  Second, the airman’s approach to warfare 
must be explained in light of its own characterizations so as to highlight the sharp relief 
with which airpower stands against the shadowy backdrop of insurgent warfare.  Through 
the lens of these characterizations, one uncovers the sway of offensive ideology, and how 
that, in turn, produces a strategic mindset limited to the application of coercive power.   
Finally, by laying the airman’s approach to war over the puzzle board of insurgent 
warfare, one discovers a mismatch as readily apparent as if one were attempting to place 
a square peg into a round hole.  So without further ado, defining the problem begins with 
the identification of insurgency’s fundamental traits. 
A. THE INSURGENTS’ WAY OF WAR  
Throughout human history, insurgent warfare perpetrated by mostly irregular 
fighters has occurred with far greater frequency than conventional warfare waged 
between the regular military forces of competing states.20  Despite this fact, the pure 
preference for pitched battle has led the conventional military forces of most states to 
neglect, and, therefore, to misunderstand insurgent warfare, even as many continued to 
struggle with insurgent fighters by incorrectly applying still more conventional means.  
Then as now, when conventional military organizations did examine insurgent warfare, it 
was the presence of irregular combatants, rather than the underlying nature of the 
conflict, that dominated their thinking with respect to this type of warfare.   As a case in 
point, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report states that the ongoing “war against 
[terror]… includes operations characterized by irregular warfare—operations in which 
                                                 
20 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
15.  For a brief survey of the topic, see John Ellis, A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare (London: Ian 
Allen, 1975).  
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the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state.”21  Here again, by focusing on 
irregular fighters, and how to “find, fix, and finish” them as Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld puts it, the American military inappropriately emphasizes the enemy’s tactics 
for challenging the state rather than understanding the basis for that challenge or its 
underlying nature.22 
1. Characteristics 
Returning to definitions already cited in the previous chapter, one recalls that 
insurgency is an organized attempt to overthrow an established government while 
counterinsurgency consists of those actions taken by the government to suppress that 
challenge.  While these definitions are simple, brief, and to the point, their very brevity 
falls short of the mark by failing to sufficiently capture the essential elements of this type 
of violent political conflict.  But what are these characteristics?  By referring to numerous 
historical case studies of insurgent warfare already completed by various scholars and 
practitioners alike, at least six fundamental traits of insurgent warfare come to light.23 
a. Struggle for Legitimacy  
Above all else, insurgent warfare represents a political struggle for the 
requisite legitimacy to control the population of a specified territory, or in other words, 
the legitimate right to rule.  This legitimacy rests within the collective mind of the 
governed populace, and it hinges upon not only the governing body’s capacity to rule, but 
just as important, its demonstrated will to do so.  In his treatise on Revolutionary Change, 
Chalmers Johnson helps explain this notion of legitimacy through his model of the social 
system based on value theory.  With assigned roles, behavioral norms, and stratification 
                                                 
21 Rumsfeld, 11. 
22 In his article on future defense capabilities (American Forces Information Service, 23 July 2005, 
online at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060112_3916.html), Jim Garamone captures the 
American military’s preoccupation with the destruction of specific threats with his quote of Secretary of 
Defense Donald S. Rumsfeld.  
23 See Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the 
Vietnam War (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1986); David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 
1956-1958, fwd. Bruce Hoffman (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006); Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); R.W. Komer, The Malayan 
Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1972); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986); Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. and ed. Samuel B. Griffith, II 
(Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, 
Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; and Robert Taber, 
The War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002).  
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of the populace, this social system provides the means for a governing body to control its 
population through the legitimate use of coercive force.  Legitimacy is afforded on the 
basis of system efficiency, or put another way, on the governing body’s demonstrated 
capability to continually synchronize the social environment with shifting popular values 
through a process of homeostasis.24  To the degree that the recognized regime is unable 
to maintain this social equilibrium, the state loses legitimacy in the eyes of a 
disenfranchised population.  Thus, its monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force 
heretofore enjoyed within the boundaries of a given territory is effectively withdrawn by 
the human community over which it has presided.25  To the degree that an insurgency can 
serve as an alternative to this failing state, the insurgents thereby gain the legitimate right 
to rule, at least from the local perspective of that segment of the population for whom 
social equilibrium is reestablished.  R.W. Komer stresses the importance of this concept 
in his comparison of the Malayan and Vietnamese insurgencies, where the differing 
degree of legitimacy afforded each insurgency by their respective populations served as 
one of the principal reasons why the former failed where as the latter succeeded.26  
b. Population—the Disputed Political Space 
Since legitimacy derives from the subject population resident within a 
specified territory, the population of that territory necessarily represents the “disputed 
political space.”27  But what is meant by the concept of political space, and how is it 
disputed?  In answering the first half of this question, political scientist Shelton Wolin 
                                                 
24 See Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1982). 
25 Although Max Weber argues that the state must be characterized by the means of coercive force 
which only it possesses, Martin Van Creveld asserts that both the state and its monopoly of legitimate force 
is nothing more than a human invention resulting from the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648.  Arguing 
that the concept of legitimacy extends beyond the state, Van Creveld points out that any community able 
and willing to exert itself for the protection of its members earns their unwavering loyalty even to the point 
where they are willing to die for it.  See Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson, “The Object Beyond 
War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,” Military Review, January-February 
2006, 13; and Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991), 
198. 
26 Komer, 79. 
27 McCormick repeatedly refers to the population as the “disputed political space.”  From Gordon H. 
McCormick, Lectures on Guerrilla Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School, August-September 2005. 
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defines political space as “the locus wherein the tensional forces of society are related.” 28  
As regards insurgent warfare, since the two principal sides—the insurgents and the 
state—both seek a legitimate right to rule that can only be vested by the people, the 
population must therefore serve as the focus of activity for both sides.  Thus, since it 
represents a setting wherein the activities of the insurgents and the state are connected 
both spatially and temporally, the population does represent the political space in any 
insurgent struggle.29  But is that political space really disputed, or does it just consist of 
two different segments of a single population each committing its loyalty and allegiance 
to one side or the other?   As David Galula, the famous French practitioner of COIN in 
Algeria theorizes, “support from the population [is] the key to the whole problem for us 
as well as the rebels.”30  Implicit in this statement is the competitive struggle between the 
state and the insurgents to garner that popular support.  Since both sides simultaneously 
seek the same political end of popular legitimacy, which can only be granted by a 
majority opinion of the whole population, the insurgents and the state do wage battle over 
their respective claims to the people’s allegiance.  Thus, the population is the sum total of 
the disputed political space. 
As scholars and practitioners of insurgent warfare realize, however, the 
opposing sides in any insurgency start from vastly different positions.31  As an 
“incumbent” power, the recognized regime of the state typically enters the fray with not 
only substantial amounts of legitimacy afforded by various segments of the population, 
but also with all the physical support inherent to the machinery of a state already in 
existence.  On the contrary, the insurgents typically operate from an extreme initial 
disadvantage.  Not only do they possess little by way of money, material, or manpower, 
but they also operate within and from the shadowy underground, where whatever 
legitimacy they do possess comes to them through the illegal political mobilization of 
                                                 
28 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics & Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); online at http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/ 
s7767.html; accessed 21 September 2006.   
29 Wolin, Politics & Vision. 
30 Galula, 113. 
31  McCormick points out the asymmetric nature of each opposing side’s initial position in any 
insurgent struggle.  The state typically has plenty of money, manpower, and material, yet very little 
intelligence, while for the insurgents the exact opposite is true.  From McCormick, Lectures on Guerrilla 
Warfare. 
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people disenfranchised by the state.  To sum up this initial inequality, the state has 
everything but to lose, and the insurgency nothing but to gain.  The irony here is that the 
state, with substantial legitimacy and almost all of the resources, often takes its popular 
support for granted while attempting to crush the insurgents directly with all its might.  
On the other hand, as the great practitioner of insurgency, Mao Tse-tung states, the 
insurgents have no choice but to look to the mass of people as the fountainhead for all of 
their potential strength.32  Thus, as Andrew Krepinevich concludes, “the bottom line for a 
successful [insurgency] is a primary support system anchored on the population.”33  In 
that sense, the populace represents the true center of gravity for both the insurgents and 
the state in any insurgent conflict.  
c. Zero-Sum Contest 
Significantly, the contest for legitimate control over the population of a 
specified territory is a zero-sum contest between the insurgents and the state.34  Simply 
put, the gain of legitimate control by the insurgents represents a loss of the same for the 
state, and vice versa.35  In reality, however, the increase in control by one side more than 
likely represents the loss of only potential control for the other, at least in the early stages 
of the struggle.  This occurs for the simple reason that at the outset of most insurgencies 
the majority of the population refuses to actively support either side as they wait to see 
who will command their allegiance, and, therefore, deserve their loyalty.  In other words, 
until either the state or the insurgents convince local people that actively supporting their 
side will generate benefits while supporting the other side will be detrimental, people 
withhold both their allegiance and their loyalty.  This corresponds to the axiom of 
insurgent warfare noted by Galula that “in any circumstances, whatever the cause, the 
population is split among three groups: (1) an active minority for the cause, (2) a neutral 
majority, [and] (3) an active minority against the cause.”36  Thus, to the degree that either 
                                                 
32 Mao, 73. 
33 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 9. 
34 McCormick repeatedly emphasizes the zero-sum nature of insurgent warfare.  From McCormick, 
Lectures on Guerrilla Warfare. 
35 According to Dixit and Nash, in the zero-sum game, one player’s gain is the other player’s loss, and 
vice versa.  See Avinnash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebluff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in 
Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 14. 
36 Galula, 114. 
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side can move in and occupy the contested middle ground of the neutral majority, the 
other side loses the opportunity to do so.  Ironically, when insurgents do threaten the 
state, the predisposition of the opposing sides often translates into the insurgents moving 
more rapidly to stake their claim.  While the state tries to crush the insurgency directly, 
the insurgents maneuver to capture greater portions of the neutral majority.  Clearly, as 
either side successfully extends its influence into this neutral area, thereby consuming it, 
the struggle between the insurgents and the state becomes much more direct in nature.  
Regardless, whether before or after this point, the nature of the insurgent struggle is that 
it is always a zero-sum game. 
d. Protracted Nature 
Insurgent warfare is almost always a protracted affair, seldom shorter than 
at least a few years, and often longer than an entire decade.37  This protracted nature is by 
design.  To survive their initial position of severe inferiority vis-à-vis the state, the 
insurgents necessarily wage a protracted conflict to obtain intermediate objectives as 
enabling steps toward the final overthrow of the ruling regime.38   In his formative work 
on the subject, Mao expounds a three-phased method for insurgents to realize their 
ultimate political end.  In the first phase, insurgents organize, consolidate, and preserve 
their popular base to provide a steady supply of recruits, food, and information.  
Characterized mostly by subversive political mobilization, training of the political cadre, 
and covert intelligence, this phase employs sporadic guerrilla operations only as required 
to protect the base.  In the second phase, the insurgents progressively expand their base 
from the periphery outward to weaken the state by draining its popular support.  Here, the 
insurgents increasingly pursue direct action against state forces to procure arms, 
ammunition, and other essentials using hit and run guerrilla tactics.  Then, in the third and 
                                                 
37 In Conflict of Myths, Cable demonstrates this point with his sampling of insurgent warfare.  From 
1925 until their withdrawal in 1933, the Marines helped the Nicaraguan government fight Sandinista 
guerrillas for more than twelve years.  From 1945 until their defeat in late 1949, Greek Communists fought 
the Nationalist government for over four years in the Greek Civil War.  From 1946 until its demise in 1954, 
the Huk Insurrection threatened the Philippine government for nearly eight years.  From 1949 until 1960, 
Chinese Communists perpetrated the eleven year-long Malayan Emergency until British-Malayan 
authorities eventually suppressed it.  Finally, for nearly three decades following World War II, Vietnamese 
Communists successfully waged two consecutive insurgencies initially against the French colonial 
administration, and then against the American-backed regime of South Vietnam, finally obtaining an 
independent and unified Vietnam in 1975.   
38 Nagl, 7. 
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final phase, the majority of insurgents move to conventional warfare to decisively destroy 
state forces in pitched battle so as to permit the installation of their own political order.39  
In the final analysis, as E.L. Katzenbach notes, this type of protracted war amounts to 
trading space for time and time for will.  By initially yielding territory to survive in the 
face of superior state forces, insurgents gain the opportunity to mobilize popular political 
resistance against the state.40  Since the contest is a zero-sum game, any gain by the 
insurgency necessarily equates to a corresponding loss by the state.  Thus, by merely 
ensuring that they do not meet with rapid defeat, the insurgents’ method of protracted war 
provides them with the greatest probability for success, while denying the state the same. 
e. War by Any and All Means 
Much more so than conventional wars fought among opposing states, 
insurgent warfare represents war waged by any and all means.  That is not to suggest that 
those means may not be limited in the magnitude of their application, at least from the 
perspective of the state, but rather to note that they are in no way restricted to the realm 
of military activities.  But why would the means be any different given the different 
forms of warfare?   First, as a struggle for legitimacy, insurgent warfare is an existential 
conflict for both sides where any outcome other than victory represents an unacceptable 
option.  Therefore, any tool that can be brought to bear to control the objective population 
is fair game.41  Second, as Martin Van Creveld explains in The Transformation of War, 
the asymmetric situation where the state is initially much stronger than the insurgents 
creates opportunities for the latter while staying the hand of the former.  For the weaker 
insurgents, necessity knows no bounds; therefore, with very little challenge to their moral 
principles, the insurgents readily seek any means to inflict maximum damage without 
exposing themselves in open combat.  However, since the state’s use of overwhelming 
force often undermines its own moral authority with respect to the population, the state 
must seek alternative means to counter the insurgents.42  Thus, one arrives at a similar 
conclusion to that which Samuel Griffith observes. 
                                                 
39 In his forward to Mao’s classic treatise on guerrilla warfare, Griffith succinctly summarizes Mao’s 
method for waging protracted warfare.  See Mao, 23. 
40 As cited in Taber, 42. 
41 McFate and Jackson, 13. 
42 Van Creveld, 174-175. 
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A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military 
action.  Because its purpose is to destroy an existing society and its 
institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure, any 
revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying 
importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological.  
For this reason, it is endowed with a dynamic quality and a dimension in 
depth that orthodox wars, whatever their scale, lack.43 
f. Supremacy of the Indirect Approach 
Without a doubt, the hallmark of the insurgents’ way of war is its reliance 
on the indirect approach, which briefly summarized, seeks to attain the political ends of 
war by avoiding direct confrontation with the opposing side.44  In its most obvious 
manifestation, that being the tactics of the insurgent guerrilla, the indirect approach 
reflects the pragmatism of dealing with state forces from an initial position of relative 
inferiority.  Mao sums it up in the following way.  “Withdraw when he advances; harass 
him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.”  But as 
Mao also details, the indirect approach must govern the insurgents’ strategy.  By being 
alert to the state’s vulnerable spots, insurgents can exploit the situation for relative 
advantage so as to strike at the state’s vital points.45  As Krepinevich elaborates, the 
object of this approach must be the population.  Through fear, appeal, or a combination of 
both, the insurgents secure popular support, be it willing or unwilling.  In turn, this 
popular base mans, feeds, shelters, equips, aids, and informs the insurgent guerrillas.  In 
the zero-sum contest of insurgent warfare, the state’s inability to control the people 
conversely depletes its own strength over time by denying it reinforcements, taxes to 
replenish the force, and intelligence necessary to pursue the insurgents to their demise.  
Thus, as Clausewitz warns, the insurgency takes its effect like fire in the heather, 
indirectly attacking the roots of state support, until such time as the flower of the state, 
dead or dying on the vine, burst forth in a general conflagration to be consumed. 
 
 
                                                 
43 Although Griffith refers to the topic as revolutionary warfare in his forward to Mao’s treatise, his 
point applies equally well to insurgent warfare.  See Mao, 7.  
44 Multiple scholars and practitioners allude to the advantage of avoiding direct confrontation, but 
Krepinevich and Nagle actually use the term.  See Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 8; and Nagle, 28. 
45 Mao, 46. 
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2. Definition 
Given these fundamental characteristics then, and adapting from multiple sources, 
one derives a comprehensive definition of insurgent warfare to describe the struggle for 
power where insurgents wrestle with the state by any available means.46  Thus, insurgent 
warfare is defined as a protracted, zero-sum contest between insurgents and the state for 
the requisite legitimacy to control the population of a specified territory.47  Insurgency is 
waged by illegal political organizations and mostly irregular military forces against the 
civil authorities, political apparatus, economic institutions, and military forces of the 
state.  To steal power from the recognized regime despite extreme disadvantage, the 
insurgency trades space for time, and time for will to slowly seize control of the disputed 
political space.  Through an indirect approach emphasizing the tactics of subversive 
political mobilization, covert intelligence, psychological operations, sabotage, terrorism, 
and guerrilla warfare, insurgents attack the state’s legitimate hold on power by largely 
avoiding direct confrontation. 
3. Typology 
Although the above definition largely holds up to the empirical evidence of most 
insurgencies, as John Waghelstein warns, one must take heed of the confounding fact that 
far more variation exists across the range of insurgent warfare than across conventional 
wars.  While the problems that underwrite these conflicts are considerably complex, their 
differences are typically subtle and nuanced.48  This diversity of insurgencies negates the 
application of any cookie cutter approach to COIN.  Instead, it compels the modern 
strategist to assess each insurgency on its own character, so as to ascertain its true nature 
and develop an appropriate response.49  With this in mind, the following list provides a 
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brief typology of insurgent warfare that is neither exhaustive nor definitive; it is merely 
meant to serve as a catalyst for further thought. 
a. National Insurgency 
National insurgencies occur where radical groups claiming to represent the 
interests of an oppressed public take up a revolutionary struggle for better governance.  
Typically, the incumbent regime faced with this type of insurgency possesses a degree of 
legitimacy and popular support directly corresponding to that percentage of the 
population benefiting from current policy.  In this type of insurgency, the dispute can 
revolve around economic classification, political ideology, or social identity based on 
race, religion, or ethnicity.  Whatever the issue, it impacts a broad swath of the 
population across the breadth of the territory.  To counter a national insurgency, the 
incumbent regime must implement various reforms to address the social grievances that 
underwrite the insurgents’ struggle.50 
b. Liberation Insurgency 
Liberation insurgencies occur when native people fight to remove the 
perceived puppet regime of another state.  Conflicts of this type typically occur within a 
state occupied by the military forces of a foreign invader, or in a former colony where the 
residue of empire still persists.  Often viewed as foreign by virtue of race, religion, or 
ethnicity, the established regime usually possesses a small degree of legitimacy and 
popular support.51  Conversely, the insurgents often enjoy the willing support of a 
substantial popular base, as well as the external support of one or more states aligned 
against that state perceived to be an occupational or imperial power.  Although extremely 
difficult, methods for countering liberation insurgencies include popular empowerment, 
or exploiting sectarian fractures to divide, co-opt, and conquer. 
c. Sectarian Insurgency 
Sectarian insurgencies take place where subnational groups divided along 
racial, religious, or ethnic lines wage an identity struggle for group survival.  Here, the 
incumbent regime is, or is perceived to be, an instrument of a dominant group or coalition 
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of groups.  Typically, the regime possesses a fair degree of legitimacy and popular 
support in proportion to that percentage of the population comprised of those groups.  
However, the fear of domination, violence, and even genocide, coupled with an 
escalation of sectarian violence, leads to increasing polarization and communal solidarity 
across all groups as the best means for ensuring communal security.52  If the final 
outcome is to be anything other than self-determined division into separate and smaller 
states, countering the insurgents will likely require the involvement of an outside state or 
coalition of states, perceived as an impartial third-party, to help the existing regime 
reestablish legitimate control over the entire contested territory by ensuring the security 
of all. 
d. Transnational Insurgency 
Transnational insurgencies occur when supranational groups attack the 
international order and a collection of its member states each possessing varying degrees 
of legitimacy and popular support.  In this type of insurgency, the primary dispute usually 
centers on a threat, perceived or real, to the supranational group’s social identity or 
economic viability.  One example occurs in the Muslim crescent, where the infusion of 
Western culture through globalization incites Islamic jihadists to perpetrate the overthrow 
of “infidel” regimes en route to restoring the great caliphate.53  Another occurs in the 
agrarian, non-industrial regions of the world, where the enforcement of international 
narcotics laws “unnecessarily restricts the free market,” thereby inciting various narcotics 
cartels to challenge legal authorities so as to protect their livelihood.  No easy task, 
countering such transnational insurgencies must involve the efforts of a broad-based 
coalition to discount the perceived threats to resident populations while highlighting 
illegal activities to strip any shred of legitimacy from these violent non-state actors.   
4. Challenges for Airpower 
With an appreciation of the insurgent’s way of war and some of its more common 
manifestations, the forward thinking airman must reflect, at least momentarily, on the 
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significant challenges that insurgent warfare might present to modern airpower.  
Fortunately, by reviewing the conclusions of several comprehensive studies on the topic, 
one arrives at the following consolidated list.54 
a. Understanding Insurgency 
Before all else, airmen must understand the insurgency that they are trying 
to thwart.  In On War, Clausewitz states this verity in no uncertain terms. 
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 
statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the 
kind of war on which they are embarking; neither making it for, nor trying 
to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.  This is the first of all 
strategic questions and the most comprehensive.55 
With this in mind, the brief typology above should demonstrate that the diversification in 
insurgent warfare makes this no simple task.  According to Anthony Cordesman, as part 
of devising an effective strategy to counter the insurgents, airmen must assess the 
insurgency’s underlying causes, know what American involvement can credibly do to 
address them, understand the will and capability of the indigenous people to help 
themselves, and face the fact that the ensuing struggle will require a certain amount of 
time, not to mention, blood and treasure.56  On a more sobering note, perhaps the most 
important question that needs to be addressed is whether waging another COIN operation 
on foreign soil is worth the effort, or if the best way to win is not to play at all, regardless 
of the resulting instability and civil unrest.57  So how can the Air Force ensure that it’s 
asking the appropriate strategic questions with respect to insurgent warfare?  First, it must 
establish and maintain a cadre of airmen well studied in the subtleties of insurgency.  
Over the course of their careers, these airmen should be tracked to gain as much 
operational experience with COIN as possible.  Second, since first hand observation 
provides the best perspective to learn the nuances of any particular insurgency, the Air 
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Force must seek opportunities to place these airmen into potential hot spots early and 
often.  By doing this, Air Force leadership could gain a conduit into the womb of 
insurgency.  Not only would this provide invaluable insights into the nature of the 
struggle, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgents, but more importantly, 
it would enable airmen to advise if, and to what degree, American airpower should 
become engaged.  Finally, as part of a broader “self-help” approach to beat the 
insurgency before it takes root, these airmen could encourage rigorous self-analysis by 
the incumbent regime to help induce necessary reforms at the earliest opportunity.58 
b. Accessing the Fight 
Since airpower will definitely play some role in any American effort for 
COIN, the Air Force must gain access to the sovereign airspace and territory of the 
incumbent regime.  Not only will nearly all transport missions either originate or 
terminate at a point within the contested territory, but fighters configured for “in theater” 
operations will need local basing to achieve their peak efficiency.59  Consequently, the 
Air Force must take measures to secure its access to the fight.  However, as David 
Shlapak points out in his work on the issue, “assured” access is no sure thing.  Regardless 
of treaties and informal agreements, the host government will always consider its own 
interests over all others, and either grant or deny access accordingly.  Thus, to shape the 
shared perception of common interests well in advance, the Air Force must use airmen to 
build links to the military forces of its potential strategic partners.  Not only would this 
reduce both the chance and magnitude of any future disagreement, but it would likely 
secure a basing option that is best for all, if and when the time comes for an increased 
commitment of American airpower.60  Finally, with first hand knowledge of the 
contested territory, these airmen could weigh in during planning to place expeditionary 
airbases in the lesser contested zones so as to mitigate risks while maximizing the 
potential contributions of American airpower to overall pacification. 
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c. Occupying the Disputed Political Space 
With the population serving as the lynch pin of any struggle for 
legitimacy, expeditionary airpower must find better ways to occupy this disputed political 
space.  Although airpower’s psychological operations and overhead presence arguably 
make inroads into the contested middle ground of the neutral majority, they neither 
penetrate nor captivate that population as much as real airmen interacting with people on 
the ground.   But for airmen to wring their hands of any responsibility for terrestrial 
matters is to deny both the laws of physics which demand that aerospace missions begin 
and end on the ground, as well as the primacy of the objective which calls for 
establishing legitimacy in the eyes of a population living on the surface of the earth.  By 
solely focusing on the means of influence that come by way of the air, expeditionary 
airpower limits its own ability to wage what General John Abizaid calls “a war of 
perceptions.”61  Thus, void of any human messenger, airpower’s muted message settles 
upon the deaf ears of a population largely surrendered to the more human face of local 
insurgents.  However, with numerous airmen ready to deploy to expeditionary airbases 
across the contested territory, opportunities abound for airmen to occupy the disputed 
political space in a much more personable way, and therefore, for far greater effect.   
d. Developing Actionable Intelligence 
If airpower is to wrest the initiative away from the insurgents, then airmen 
must develop more actionable intelligence—accurate, timely, complete, and sufficiently 
relevant to support the warfighter’s decision-making.62  However, as Corum and Johnson 
point out, the production of quality intelligence during insurgent warfare is exceedingly 
more difficult than in conventional wars for several reasons.  First, the insurgents present 
an elusive and opaque opponent because they operate within and from a subterranean 
world, exposing themselves only as much as required to prosecute their attacks before 
blending back into the cover of the general populace.63  Second, to glean real information 
about the insurgency, old-fashioned human intelligence derived from agents and 
informants must be coupled with investigative police analysis.64  Of note, this new 
                                                 
61 Barno, 15. 
62 Checkmate and Deep Blue, 36. 
63 Vick, Grissom, Rosenau, Grill, and Mueller, 33. 
64 Corum and Johnson, 434. 
27 
emphasis on human intelligence and narrow field surveillance to find, fix, and observe 
small groups of insurgents represents a significant paradigm shift for which the modern 
intelligence community is largely unprepared.65  Third, to enable further penetration and 
exploitation of the insurgency, intelligence training and collection must refocus to 
concentrate more on understanding insurgent networks, including their links to popular 
support.66  Finally, the compartmentalization of modern intelligence too often limits the 
sharing of data and analysis necessary to produce and disseminate actionable intelligence 
to the warfighter.67  Significantly, the common thread tying most of these issues together 
is the human dimension of insurgent warfare.  Here again, by applying the human capital 
of its own airmen to intelligence operations within the contested territory, the Air Force 
could make great strides towards fixing the problem.   
e. Applying Discriminate Force 
Although the military instrument is often used in COIN to compel the 
insurgents to stop their activities through the application of physical force, airmen must 
use caution to apply such force only in the most discriminate manner.68  Accordingly, 
this requires that airmen apply only the minimum force necessary to achieve desired 
effects on a specific target, and that those effects be in direct proportion to the amount of 
change required in the enemy’s behavior.  Such technical definitions aside, the blunt 
reality from the airman’s perspective is that the bombing of innocent civilians, whether 
deliberate or unintentional, is ineffective and counterproductive for at least the following 
reasons.69  First, such acts usually antagonize the very population that the incumbent 
regime is trying to enlist, in effect yielding the disputed political space to the insurgents.  
Furthermore, when antagonized by the depredations of the state, the once neutral majority 
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will turn to actively supporting the insurgents with recruits, resources, and information.  
Second, civilian deaths and collateral damage generally provide petrol for the insurgents’ 
propaganda machine.  Thus, as one study warns, “while conventional wars certainly have 
political dimensions, counterinsurgency is far more politicized, and its practitioners must 
always be alert to the potential strategic consequences of even the most tactical of 
operations.”70  Thus, as the saying would go, for one errant bomb, the population was 
lost, and the regime fell.  Finally, as Corum and Johnson argue, to the degree that 
airpower represents a unique capability of modern states, people in the lesser developed 
world are often predisposed to view aerial bombardment, whether precise or not, as cruel 
and heavy-handed; therefore, its application in any form serves to provoke the ire of 
those not so endowed.71  In summary, regardless of how discrete and precise modern 
airpower may become, airmen need to continue expanding their horizons for the use of 
discriminate force in COIN, or risk being shot down in a war of public perceptions. 
f. Building State Capacity 
In the struggle for the legitimate right to rule, the Air Force must find 
ways to help build the state’s capacity for good governance.  In their study of Airpower in 
the Era of Insurgency, Allan Vick and his colleagues at RAND outline several key ways 
to reinforce the public’s perception that the regime is both willing and ready to rule.  
First, through competent police organizations, the state can meet its fundamental 
responsibility of providing security and public safety to the polity.  Not only does this 
build confidence in the regime, but it also shrinks the political space available to the 
insurgents as an increasingly supportive populace provides additional information about 
the insurgents.  Second, through the development and demonstrated performance of state 
institutions such as public services, civil administration, education, and health care, the 
state extends its presence throughout the disputed political space while working to erase 
the social grievances that underwrite the insurgency.  Coupled with the creation of 
infrastructure such as schools, roads, or airports, the regime reinforces within the 
populace its unyielding determination to prevail.  Finally, if the state is to possess any 
semblance of legitimacy, it must enact, consistently assert, and operate, itself, under a 
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rule of law administered through an impartial system of justice.72  On a cautionary note, 
while the system employed by most Western democracies may appear to be a good 
starting point, as Cordesman notes, legitimacy is always “measured in local terms and not 
in the terms of American ideology.”73  So given all of the above, how can the Air Force 
help?  By once again leveraging the skills of its own highly trained airmen to solve 
human problems at the local level, the Air Force can help “the state deliver what the 
insurgents can only promise.”74 
g. Posturing the Expeditionary Air Force 
While each challenge of insurgent warfare is unique, each is similar to the 
rest in that it relies on the disposition of airmen to posture the expeditionary Air Force.  
But what measures can the Air Force take to posture itself better in light of all these 
challenges?  First, it must provide its airmen with so called “social intelligence,” or rather 
the language skills and cultural awareness necessary for airmen to work through, by, and 
with a local population foreign to themselves.  Second, the Air Force must cultivate in its 
airmen an understanding of the various social structures which comprise the disputed 
political space, or what Megan Scully terms the “anthropological finesse” to negotiate the 
complex social networks of various tribes and clans permeating most populations.75  By 
accomplishing these two steps, the Air Force arms its airmen with the knowledge and 
skills to establish human sources by which to penetrate the underground and isolate the 
insurgent.  However, as Krepinevich notes, for anyone to truly succeed against a foreign 
insurgency, time is required to gain familiarity, earn trust, win confidence, and establish 
influence.76  Thus, as a necessary third step, the Air Force must implement longer tours 
of duty for its airmen performing COIN.  To do otherwise, as Loren Boritz argues in 
Backfire, is just bad business—the equivalent of transferring an employee before the 
completion of on-the-job training.77  Finally, in light of the truism that COIN is primarily 
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the business of ground forces, the Air Force should shift its focus to concentrate precisely 
there.  While it must continue to seek better ways of utilizing air and space to impact 
operations on the ground, more importantly, the Air Force must seize its own opportunity 
to realize the greatest gain for COIN by investing in the capabilities of those airmen who 
could occupy and influence the disputed political space where it truly exists—on the 
ground, around the airbase, in the surrounding community, and among the population. 
B. THE AIRMAN’S APPROACH TO WARFARE 
Against this backdrop of insurgency’s challenges for airpower, one turns next to 
the airman’s approach to warfare so as to silhouette either its appropriateness or 
inappropriateness.  Although a thorough review is neither warranted nor offered, a 
cursory look into several common characterizations of airpower serves as the springboard 
for further assessment. 
1. Characterizations 
Responsible for delivering sovereign options to defend the United States and its 
global interests, the Air Force maintains a wealth of doctrine to govern how airmen 
should fly and fight.78  Based in large part on the unique capabilities of airpower, 
including speed, range, and flexibility, this doctrine also serves to provide the sine qua 
non for airpower, that being air and space dominance.  However, despite airpower’s 
unique contributions to warfare and more than a half-century of independence, the Air 
Force still struggles with its own relevance.  Consequently, airmen have overstated their 
case and stretched new concepts of operation to reinforce that relevance when it never 
should have been doubted.  In the end, the collective mind of airmen has been largely 
shaped by more than one of airpower’s more prevalent characterizations.   
a. Strategic Decisiveness 
Since the airplane’s introduction to warfare almost a century ago, airmen 
have claimed that airpower possesses a quality of strategic decisiveness not shared by the 
other military instruments.  As Phillip Meilinger notes, the airman’s ability to operate at 
the strategic level of war for immediate effects has served as airpower’s raison d’etre 
since aircraft first took to the skies.  As the logic goes, strategic attack, or rather the 
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bombing of an enemy’s vital centers deep within his own defended territory, represents a 
singular capability possessed by no other service.79  Although time has witnessed 
different permutations of Giulio Douhet’s original theory for strategic attack, airmen have 
always believed that airpower enjoys a unique capability to achieve national objectives 
by adversely affecting an enemy’s leadership, resources, and strategy.80  And since 
airpower can be strategically decisive where others cannot, proponents of this line of 
reasoning have always argued that airpower should play a predominant role, with a 
corresponding emphasis on strategic attack.  Yet in The Transformation of American Air 
Power, Benjamin Lambeth reveals how more than one analyst has reviewed the history of 
airpower to render the verdict that strategic attack cannot be considered decisive.81  
While Lambeth agrees with that assessment, he argues that the point is moot, however, 
since new airpower capabilities obviate the need to break the enemy’s will as Douhet 
originally proposed.  “Owing to precision, stealth, and enhanced information availability, 
airmen are now paradoxically able to use airpower as first envisioned by its earliest 
advocates, but not in a way that they even remotely could have foreseen.”82  Bypassing 
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the typically elusive goal of destroying an enemy’s hostile will, airpower can now 
proceed directly to the enemy’s throat by destroying the hostile ability resident in his 
military forces.83  Thus, applying new logic to an old argument, Lambeth concludes that 
airpower’s transformation has actually delivered on airpower’s promise by “permitting 
the achievement of strategic goals of a supremely military nature from the outset of the 
fighting.”84  In summary, although airmen may be admitting that strategic attack is not all 
that it purports, there seems to be little give in the airman’s core belief that airpower is 
still strategically preeminent. 
b. Real-Time Targeting 
As the object of airpower’s strategic capability shifts from vital centers to 
fielded forces, the concept of real-time targeting has assumed center stage in the airman’s 
approach to warfare.  By shifting from the vital centers of leadership and war-sustaining 
industry to the mechanized units of an enemy’s fielded forces, airpower’s focus has 
necessarily shifted from fixed to mobile targets.  Consequently, as opposed to executing 
planned strikes against predetermined targets of strategic value, airmen increasingly 
execute flexible operations throughout the battlespace to destroy an enemy’s emerging 
military capabilities before they can be brought to bear.  However, as Lambeth points out, 
these operations hinge upon outstanding intelligence as a necessary precondition for 
airpower to achieve strategic decisiveness.85  Relying on a vast network of information 
systems to link overhead sensors to a decision-maker and all his potential shooters, real-
time targeting seeks to expeditiously find, fix, and finish fleeting targets before they can 
disappear into the fog of war.86  However, as Meilinger notes, airpower’s ability to finish 
targets has always exceeded its ability to find and fix them.87  Moreover, with the sensor, 
decision-maker, and shooter seldom being one in the same, the requirement for a timely 
flow of accurate and comprehensive information about an enemy that does not stay put 
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has become greater than ever before.  Finally, since sensors and shooters must constantly 
be directed where to go and for what to look, good intelligence must observe the effects 
of earlier operations to orient decision-makers regarding those actions still to be 
decided.88  Thus, as Meilinger sums it all up, “in essence, airpower is targeting, targeting 
is intelligence, and intelligence is assessing the effects of air operations.”89 
c. Standoff Precision Firepower 
As airmen state their case, airpower has come of age with the development 
and regular use of standoff precision firepower from the air.  By enabling airpower to 
destroy an enemy’s military capabilities on the battlefield at minimal cost in terms of 
blood and treasure, standoff precision firepower has arguably given airpower the strategic 
decisiveness that airmen have always claimed.90  With long-range, high altitude 
aerospace systems employing state-of-the-art weapons from afar, airpower now couples 
real-time targeting with standoff precision firepower to avoid most threats while 
eliminating the rest so as to kill even mobile and armored targets with virtual impunity.  
Enabled by modern technology and new concepts of operation, this amazing ability to 
apply discriminate force near friendly forces, or in the midst of urban terrain where 
noncombatants and collateral structures abound, produces an across the board reduction 
in both human casualties and unintended destruction.  More importantly, by employing 
machines over men, airpower saves lives while providing theater commanders with a 
more responsible and effective way to apply coercive force than in head-to-head, ground 
combat.91  Thus, as Lambeth concludes, airpower’s greatest contribution may be… 
…its capacity to save lives—enemy lives through the use of precision to 
minimize noncombatant fatalities, and friendly lives through the 




                                                 
88 In a very real sense, the success or failure of real-time targeting relies on the airman’s ability to 
operate inside the enemy’s decision cycle by out-thinking him.  According to John Boyd, by tightening 
one’s own “OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop” with respect to the opponent, one could gain the 
initiative, and therefore, the advantage.   See Meilinger, Dog Days for the Air Force: What’s Wrong and 
How It Can Be Fixed, 17-18. 
89 Meilinger, Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower, 20. 
90 Meilinger, Dog Days for the Air Force: What’s Wrong and How It Can Be Fixed, 27. 
91 Lambeth, 289. 
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conditions in which land elements, once unleashed, can do their jobs 
without significant resistance because of the degraded capabilities of 
enemy forces.92 
d. Aerospace Expeditionary Force 
To deliver sustained airpower to theater commanders while maintaining its 
long-term health, the expeditionary Air Force has relied on an organizational structure 
known as the aerospace expeditionary force, or AEF.  Initially developed to support a 
strategy of engagement after the First Gulf War, the AEF allowed the Air Force to meet 
the burgeoning demand for expeditionary airpower despite a dwindling supply of forward 
based resources in the wake of the Cold War drawdown.93  Additionally, it enabled the 
Air Force to provide tailored packages of expeditionary airpower for use in small-scale 
contingencies while retaining the capability to ramp-up and fight two major theater wars 
simultaneously.94  However, after several years of sustained AEF deployments by only a 
fraction of the Air Force, the high operational tempo of deploying units generated the 
twin problems of impaired readiness and reduced retention.95  To address these two 
critical concerns, the Air Force expanded its expeditionary approach while adapting the 
AEF for broader application to the entire force.  To provide sufficient time for units to 
train, prepare, deploy, and reconstitute in conjunction with expeditionary tasking, as well 
as a measure of predictability for the personnel involved, the expeditionary Air Force 
established a revolving 15-month AEF cycle consisting of five consecutive 3-month 
periods.  To fill the rotation, the expeditionary Air Force structured itself into ten similar 
but distinctive AEFs, and two on-call aerospace expeditionary wings.  Since the latter 
were reserved for less probable crisis deployments, they simply alternated their on-call 
status with each 3-month period.  As for the former, they were organized into five 
                                                 
92 Lambeth, 303. 
93 During the first term of President William J. Clinton, the U.S. military continued three major 
operations in Iraq and Somalia, while initiating seven more in Haiti and the Balkans.  From 1991 to 1998, 
the Air Force lost two-thirds of its forward European bases.  Over the same period, it saw its number of 
fighter wing equivalents drop from 36 to 20, while its bomber, tanker, and transport fleets experienced 
reductions of 50, 40, and 30 percent, respectively.  See Richard G. Davis, Anatomy of a Reform: The 
Expeditionary Aerospace Force (Washington, D.C.: The Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003), 
12-18. 
94 Richard G. Davis, 19. 
95 Since most early expeditionary tasking supported operations in southern Iraq, the vast majority of 
expeditionary airpower belonged to the air component of U.S. Central Command, or Ninth Air Force.  See 
Richard G. Davis, 11. 
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separate AEF pairs, with each pair responsible for fulfilling steady-state airpower 
requirements during a single 3-month period.  Thus, with some exceptions, the 
implementation of this AEF structure ensured that most units and their assigned airmen 
deployed to theater for no more than three months during any given AEF cycle.  
Remarkably, this not only fixed readiness and retention, but it also met the needs of 
theater commanders.96  Moreover, it set the standard for how expeditionary airpower 
would operate in the years to come.  Even now, with only minor adjustments, the AEF 
cycle still governs the operational tempo of the expeditionary Air Force, and every 
airman within it.97 
2. Cult of the Offensive 
While any complete assessment of airpower could not be limited to these four 
characterizations, strategic decisiveness, real-time targeting, standoff precision firepower, 
and the aerospace expeditionary force do serve to highlight the advanced state of 
offensive airpower at the twilight of its first century in being.  Capable of projecting itself 
into foreign theaters of war to find, fix, and finish an enemy’s military capabilities, 
modern airpower appears to possess a quality of strategic decisiveness undelivered by the 
other military instruments.  Thus, as the airman’s argument goes, offensive airpower 
must be the logical first choice for any situation in which the military instrument may be 
applied.  But should airmen be concerned by such a fortuitous development?   
In his treatise on the cult of the offensive, John Carter warns airmen to beware 
“the condition that occurs when an organization believes so strongly in the supremacy of 
offense that it no longer develops and evaluates its doctrine rationally.”98  Since doctrine 
informs policy, and policy shapes strategy, this abiding faith in the offense can easily 
produce both a force structure and strategic approach that are altogether, or at least in 
part, inappropriate.  Given the recent accomplishments of offensive airpower in both the 
Balkans and the Persian Gulf, airmen must be cautious of unreasonably high expectations 
regarding their ability to purchase influence through the use of coercive force.  Failing to 
                                                 
96 Richard G. Davis, 86. 
97 In 2003, the expeditionary Air Force extended the AEF cycle to twenty months, with each AEF pair 
responsible for deploying during a single 4-month period of the cycle. 
98 John R. Carter, Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
University Press, 1998), 27. 
36 
diversify either the capitalization of the future Air Force or its strategic applications, 
airmen run the risk of becoming ensnared in a trap of their own cultic ideology.99 
3. Coercion – A Strategic Mindset 
To a large degree, the airman’s offensive ideology has produced a corresponding 
strategic mindset that views all military action through the confining lens of coercive 
force.  That is not to say that under the broadest definitions of coercion put forward by 
theorist such as Thomas Schelling that this is somehow inappropriate, but rather to 
suggest that airmen typically apply a much more narrow definition of coercion based on 
the use of force either to deter an enemy from commencing an undesired action, or to 
compel him to cease that action once it has been commenced.100  The crucial distinction 
here, from the airman’s point of view, is not that coercion is causing someone else to 
choose one course of action over another by making the coercer’s preference appear more 
attractive than the alternative, but rather that the instrument of coercion always comes 
down to either the use or threatened use of physical violence.101 
 
Type Means Mechanism 
Denial Negate ability to attain goals Reduce hostile will by reducing ability 
Decapitation Destroy regime to paralyze state     Reduce hostile will by disrupting ability 
Destruction Destroy state capacity Regardless of will destroy current ability 
Table 1.   Coercive Airpower Strategy. 
                                                 
99 Carter, 94. 
100 According to Schelling, coercion amounts to the use of influence to either create a desirable 
outcome or prevent an undesirable one.  Significantly, it is not the pain that matters but rather the influence 
on someone’s behavior.  However, by referencing various essays on coercion written by or for airmen, one 
notes that most emphasize the use of force as the coercive instrument.  See Thomas Schelling, Arms and 
Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 3; Scott Walker, “A Unified Field Theory of 
Coercive Airpower,” Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 1997, online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 
airchronicles/apj/apj97/sum97.walker.html, accessed 29 June 2006; and Karl Mueller, “The Essence of 
Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists,” Air & Space Power Journal – Chronicles Online 
Journal, 17 September 2001, online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/cc/mueller.html, 
accessed 29 June 2006. 
101 In “The Essence of Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists,” Mueller provides his 
own definition of coercion which serves as the basis for the one presented here.  
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Although theorist Karl Mueller clearly states that the broadest definition of 
coercion implies nothing with respect to the means by which it is administered, a brief 
review of the professional literature may suggest that airmen think otherwise.102  
Combining theories from two separate essays written by Mueller and airpower 
practitioner Scott Walker, Table 1 provides a consolidated list of three different types of 
coercion, as well as the means and mechanism by which each affects the enemy.103  
Although this list is neither authoritative nor definitive, it does provide a quick look into 
the airman’s mind with respect to coercive airpower.  Without excessive detail, the table 
reveals how coercive airpower relies on physical violence to make an enemy perform a 
cost-benefit analysis so as to select a value-maximizing option that equates to the 
coercer’s preference.104  Regardless of the type of coercion, the means for each requires 
that an application of force be directed against the enemy to either deter or compel him.  
This reliance on coercive force represents the airman’s strategic mindset that thinks the 
only way to apply airpower is through a threat or act of harm.105  Thus, as airmen see it, 
the use of airpower to achieve strategic objectives relies on the transaction of coercive 
influence in which the only currency of exchange is, and must be, force. 
C. AIRPOWER IN COIN – SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE 
By placing the airman’s approach to warfare against the backdrop of insurgency’s 
challenges, the airman’s preconceptions emerge so as to judge better the efficacy of his 
ways and means.  In so doing, the astute observer concludes that the expeditionary Air 
Force is inappropriately shaped for COIN.  While that in no way suggests that airpower’s 
contributions to COIN have been anything less than substantial, it does suggest that until 
                                                 
102 In “The Essence of Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists,” Mueller states that 
coercion may involve military force, economic sanctions, or a whole range of other political pressures.  
However, he also admits that his essay focuses “mainly on coercion through threats of harm since this is 
how coercive airpower is most often used.” 
103 Although Walker lists four types of coercion to include punishment, risk, denial, and decapitation, 
Mueller describes only three, those being punishment, denial, and destruction.  In constructing Table 1, the 
author consolidates the two lists by eliminating risk and destruction.  On the one hand, risk is eliminated 
since it is only a variation of punishment.  On the other, destruction is eliminated since, in the purest sense, 
it fails to meet the coercive goal of changing the enemy’s behavior.  See Walker, “A Unified Field Theory 
of Coercive Airpower,” and Mueller, “The Essence of Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military 
Strategists.” 
104 Checkmate and Deep Blue, 115. 
105 In “The Essence of Coercive Air Power: A Primer for Military Strategists,” Mueller, himself, 
focuses his discussion on threats of harm since this is how coercive airpower is most often employed. 
38 
the Air Force implements some major changes, the full extent of airpower’s contributions 
to COIN cannot be realized.  So what preconceptions lurk within the airman’s mind? 
As in any human endeavor, both a definition of the problem and a framework for 
its solution must exist in the minds of men before any appropriate action can be taken, 
unless by way of stumbling, or shear blind luck.  So with respect to COIN, has the Air 
Force prepared its collective mind to meet the insurgents’ challenge, and has it positioned 
its individual airmen so that they can rapidly orient to a specific insurgency, if so 
required?  Regarding the first of these two questions, the Air Force must take notice that 
when it comes to war, airmen naturally default to a “find, fix, and finish” mentality 
calling for the immediate use of force to destroy the enemy—an approach not entirely 
appropriate for an adversary who does not readily present himself to the risks of open 
combat.106  In part, this occurs due to the airman’s abiding faith in offensive power, and 
the resulting strategic mindset which views the application of the military instrument 
through the confining lens of coercive influence.  It also occurs because airmen seek 
strategic decisiveness rather than a strategic decision.  Thus, they inappropriately pursue 
direct attack when it cannot produce the results for which it was intended.  Additionally, 
since the insurgent wins by not losing, the airman’s quest for a decisive result can prove 
self-defeating, as airmen work in the futile pursuit of a seemingly impossible goal.107  As 
regards the second of these two questions, the Air Force’s dogmatic application of the 
AEF cycle arguably fails to give airmen sufficient time to orient their minds to the nature 
of the fight.  By rotating airmen into and out of the contested territory every three to four 
months, the AEF cycle robs airpower of those airmen with any experience in the disputed 
political space.  In so doing, the Air Force relegates airpower’s play in insurgent warfare 
to the domain of virtual rookies.  As for trying to understand the insurgency, airmen 
hardly have a chance.  Consequently, when the time comes for airmen to work the details 
of how to meet the insurgents’ challenges, they are insufficiently postured, and, therefore, 
intellectually unprepared.  So with this understanding of the airman’s mind, how do 
airpower’s ways and means measure up to the insurgents’ challenge? 
                                                 
106 Vick, Grissom, Rosenau, Grill, and Mueller, 43. 
107 Searle, “Making Airpower Effective Against Guerrillas,” 16-17. 
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Although coercive strategy plays a role in insurgent warfare, the COIN strategist 
must be careful not to limit strategic thought to the threat or use of harm as the principal 
way to an end.  Within any insurgency, there must be room for “soft” power to co-opt, 
induce, persuade, and dissuade, short of having to issue explicit threats or take actions 
that intend physical harm.  Regardless, airmen must take note that coercing guerrillas is a 
complicated affair for at least four reasons.  First, since insurgent warfare represents a 
struggle for legitimacy within the population’s collective mind, coercion presents a multi-
layered game in which the coercer seeks to alter the behavior of not only insurgents, but 
various other actors occupying the disputed political space.  Second, because the 
insurgency is itself an illegal organization with numerous actors operating for a variety of 
different interests, the insurgents will likely respond to cost-benefit calculus in a loosely 
rational way, often with far less predictability than say the government of another state.  
Third, since insurgency is a desperate act committed by those who see no better option 
than risking everything for something other than the status quo, punishment and denial 
strategies traditionally find little purchase within the insurgent mind.  Finally, coercers 
must be aware that the insurgents’ revolutionary zeal may void true cost-benefit calculus 
in situations where the price can never be too high.108  In the end, airmen must exercise 
great caution before reducing insurgent warfare to nothing but a form of coercion.109  
Moving on to real-time targeting, one notes that the concept suffers at least two 
serious limitations that directly impede the advantages of airpower afforded by speed and 
flexibility.  First, despite its plethora of overhead sensors, airpower possesses dubious 
capabilities to cull insurgents that do not wish to be seen from among the crowds in 
which they operate.110  Although airpower’s sensors may see and hear the bulk of the 
population, more often than not, even the most advanced technology cannot distinguish 
individual profiles and voices from within the clutter and noise of humanity.  Second, 
despite an extensive network of communications, airpower’s execution suffers noticeable 
lag time where as the insurgents’ does not.   Because airpower is centrally controlled, the 
sensor, decision-maker, and shooter are seldom one in the same, while the exact opposite 
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110 Searle, “Making Airpower Effective Against Guerrillas,” 18. 
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is true for the guerrillas.  Consequently, the insurgent routinely operates inside the 
airman’s decision cycle, seizing and maintaining the initiative, while airman try to react 
in a timely manner, but usually miss the opportunity altogether.111  Thus, despite 
airpower’s potential ability to respond rapidly to a variety of situations, its advanced 
technology and longer kill chain with respect to the guerrillas’ often prevent airmen from 
achieving any desired ends. 
With respect to standoff precision firepower, the quest for antiseptic lethality also 
proves problematic.  First, because the insurgents operate among the populace, nearly 
every lethal attack runs the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage; where urban 
terrain comes into play, the risks only get worse.  Thus, in the war of perceptions, even 
the well-placed bomb can be strategically decisive, albeit in ways that the airman never 
wanted.  While the Air Force continues to develop low-yield, precision weapons to 
reduce the adverse effects of such unintended consequences, as long as the intent is 
lethal, the problem can never be eliminated.112  Second, airmen must remember that 
airpower takes no prisoners, and dead insurgents do not talk.  With the price of good 
information coming at a premium, killing insurgents does not come without a cost.113  
Third, by pursuing quick kinetic solutions to single budding insurgents many times over, 
airpower often ignores the roots of insurgency even as they spread unabated.  Finally, for 
its role in propping the myth of antiseptic lethality, standoff precision firepower often 
encourages clumsy foreign policy by giving policymakers a false pretense that airpower 
can purchase victory at bargain prices, even as the record of insurgent warfare clearly 
indicates otherwise.114 
In the final analysis, traditional conceptions of airpower and high technology pay 
too small a dividend in COIN for airmen to rely solely on their use.  While that is not to 
suggest that they are altogether inappropriate, it does suggest that they are not as 
appropriate as other ways and means when it comes to countering the insurgents.  If that 
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is the case, then those alternative ways and means should be developed to reinforce what 
airpower already brings to the fight.  As with any human endeavor, however, the problem 
is not so much the tools as it is the people who wield them, and the case of airpower in 
COIN is no exception.  Imbued with a cultic belief in the power of the offensive, airmen 
resist what Loren Baritz calls “fighting down,” or beating the insurgents at their own 
game, because such “simple” methods fail to reinforce the offensive roles with which 
airmen most identify.  Consequently, the Air Force continues to focus on its own 
preconceived notion of using overwhelming firepower to crush a conventional enemy it 
wishes to fight, rather than the insurgent guerrilla with which it is faced.115  Thus, 
airpower finds itself largely out of shape for the kind of warfare it faces in the twenty-
first century where manpower trumps firepower and intelligence must be earned rather 
than purchased.  Metaphorically, then, airpower in COIN represents the proverbial square 
peg in a round hole—it just does not fit, at least as well as it should. 
As in most cases, understanding the nature of airpower’s problem in COIN sheds 
light on the potential solution.  As Baritz sums it all up, “insurgency [is] an intensely 
human problem” that technology simply cannot solve.116  As such, it requires a human 
solution.  Therefore, if the expeditionary Air Force is to shape itself to become more 
effective in COIN, it must develop the human capital resident in its own airmen so that it 
can put manpower in front of firepower as required.  Of course, to guide that process, 
airmen must first possess a conceptual framework for understanding the interplay 
between insurgents and the state.  That framework serves as the logical starting point for 
further discussion. 
                                                 
115 Baritz, 263-264. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
43 
III. FRAMING THE SOLUTION  
Before airmen can begin to contribute to COIN in more than just a peripheral role, 
they must first possess a conceptual framework by which to understand the nature of 
insurgency, and their relationship to it.  As alternatives emerge from such a framework, 
airmen must then expand their conception of influence beyond the airman’s traditional 
mindset of coercive airpower strategy limited to the application of physical force.  
Finally, to take such an abstract framework and mechanize it such that it can be applied 
to COIN in the real world, airmen must develop a basic understanding of the classic 
pacification campaign so that they can determine how best to fit airpower into the fight.  
So to begin framing a solution, what is the proper conceptual framework for 
understanding insurgent warfare? 
A. FRAMEWORK FOR INSURGENT WARFARE  
Advocated by celebrated COIN practitioner Sir Robert Thompson of Malayan 
fame, the popular “hearts-and-minds” theory focuses on the internal social grievances 
that give rise to an insurgent movement and the popular support which sustains it.117  In 
economic terms, it stresses the demand side of insurgent warfare, or rather the social 
forces that underwrite the insurgents’ challenge to the state.118  As the theory goes, by 
eliminating the demand for a change to the status quo, the insurgents are effectively put 
out of business.  Consequently, the hearts-and-minds theory advocates the suppression of 
insurgency by garnering popular support for the state using a three pronged approach 
aimed at improving security, living conditions, and governance within the disputed 
political space.  Using a combination of inducements and coercion, or the proverbial 
“carrot and stick,” the practitioner of the hearts-and-minds theory manipulates popular 
loyalties by appealing to the likes and dislikes of people.119   
                                                 
117 In their essay developing the alternative Cost-Benefit Model, Leites and Wolf provide a brief 
overview of the Hearts-and-Minds Model to support their comparative analysis of the two.  See Nathan 
Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 150. 
118 Ronald F. Stuewe, Jr., One Step Back, Two Steps Forward: An Analytical Framework for 
Airpower in Small Wars, Published thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006, 10. 
119 Leites and Wolf, 150.  Also see Osman Dogan, Shadow Wars: An Analysis of Counterinsurgency 
Warfare, Published thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2005, 73. 
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Juxtaposed against this theory stands the alternative “cost-benefit” theory 
proposed by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf of RAND.  Here, insurgency represents an 
operating system that takes inputs from either local or foreign sources and then uses some 
means of production to convert them into the outputs of active insurgency.120  In other 
words, information, people, and material are transformed by analysis, training, and 
logistics into the intelligence, guerrillas, and weapons that feed the fight.  According to 
this theory, the focus should be on the effectiveness of the insurgents’ activities as they 
impact the opportunity costs of popular choice to either support or not support the 
insurgency.  As such, this theory places less emphasis on the demand for a change to the 
status quo than on the supply of insurgent activity as it relates to the cost-benefit calculus 
of the population.121  Consequently, cost-benefit theory advocates quelling insurgency by 
focusing COIN efforts on one of two areas, or some combination thereof.  At one 
extreme, COIN can reduce the availability and therefore raise the costs of inputs to the 
system.  On the other, it can curtail outputs from the system by either interfering with the 
means of production, or directly blocking the flow of outputs.122  In any case, the 
practitioner of cost-benefit theory employs a combination of inducements and coercion to 
manipulate behavior so as “to increase the costs and difficulties of insurgent operations… 
rather than [trying to win] popular loyalty and support.”123 
                                                 
120 Charles Wolf, Jr., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities, Paper 
published by RAND, July 1965, 10. 
121 Leites and Wolfe, 151. 
122 Wolf, 11. 
123 Wolf, 25.  Not surprisingly, Leites and Wolf advocate their own alternative cost-benefit theory 
over the hearts-and-minds theory by noting that insurgency can survive and expand in the absence of 
popular support so long as certain inputs can be obtained at reasonable costs, as measured in the 
expenditure of both money and coercion.  See Wolf, 5.  As an airman, Stuewe also favors the alternative 
cost-benefit theory, but for a slightly different reason based more on its applicability to airpower than on 
any apparent weakness of the hearts-and-minds theory itself.  Since the cost-benefit theory deals with the 
supply side of the problem, it provides airpower with a more appropriate way to enter the fight.  As Stuewe 
argues, in highlighting the process by which insurgent activities are produced, the cost-benefit theory 
provides “more definitive analysis regarding the effectiveness of airpower as a means to counter… 
production.”  Stepping back then to the application of that airpower, one logically concludes that the focus 
of airpower targeting would likely be the means of production and the outputs so produced.  See Stuewe, 
10.  In his comparison of the two models, Dogan seems to provide the dissenting opinion by finding fewer 
faults with the hearts-and-minds theory than the alternative.  Accordingly, Dogan points out that the cost-
benefit theory suffers at least three serious limitations.  Not only does it assume that the population always 
behaves in a rational way, but it also assumes that coercion is always the principal tool employed by the 
insurgents, both of which the empirical evidence clearly refutes.  Finally, while the hearts-and-minds theory 
may focus primarily on the demand side of the problem, the cost-benefit theory suffers the same fallacy 
from a different perspective by emphasizing the supply side.  See Dogan, 71-73. 
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In considering the alternatives available for COIN, airmen must consider a few 
final points.  First, the state must take the swiftest action possible to nip the insurgency in 
the bud before it really gets started.  As multiple scholars have emphasized, time always 
works to the insurgents’ advantage.  The longer the insurgency persists, the greater is the 
erosion of state legitimacy in the eyes of the population.  Thus, for the state to increase its 
probability of successfully thwarting the insurgents, it is absolutely imperative to act at 
the earliest opportunity.124  Second, the civilian-military duality of insurgency requires 
that the state fight and defeat the insurgents on two separate fronts, one anchored firmly 
in the hearts-and-minds of the populace, and the other anchored in the military 
capabilities of the insurgents.125  Thus, effective COIN must strike a balance between 
reforms aimed at eliminating social grievances and security force action aimed at 
eliminating the insurgent threat.126  Third, in light of the first two points, stabilization and 
reconstruction must be understood as integral to any COIN strategy from the outset of 
operations, and not something that follows a phase dominated by actual combat.127  By 
focusing on those actions that benefit the all-important public, stabilization and 
reconstruction purchase the time and popular support required to identify and defeat the 
insurgents.  
B. STRATEGIC PORTFOLIO OF INFLUENCES 
Airmen must expand their conception of influence beyond the confining 
boundaries of coercive airpower strategy limited to the application of physical force.  As 
Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins argue in their study on Deterrence and Influence, airmen 
must broaden their thinking to adopt a portfolio of influences—some which are positive 
inducements and others that are quite coercive—similar to those shown in Table 2.128 
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Type Means Mechanism 
Co-option Assume ownership Generate good will regardless of ability 
Inducement Award things of value Increase good will by increasing ability 
Persuasion Embrace through reasoning Increase good will regardless of ability 
Dissuasion Deter through reasoning Reduce hostile will  regardless of ability 
Punishment Take things of value Reduce hostile will regardless of ability 
Risks Rapidly take things of value Reduce hostile will by reducing ability 
Denial Negate ability to attain goals Reduce hostile will by reducing ability 
Decapitation Destroy regime to paralyze state Reduce hostile will by disrupting ability 
Destruction Destroy state capacity Regardless of will destroy current ability 
Annihilation Obliterate national population Regardless of will destroy future ability 
Table 2.   Strategic Portfolio of Influences.129 
 
To provide airmen with the capability to achieve real influence over the 
population, Davis and Jenkins advocate using a systems approach to focus and tailor 
influence for multiple targets within the disputed political space.  Recognizing that any 
insurgency is a complex system comprised of many different entities and processes 
arrayed in various organizational structures, to include both hierarchies and distributed 
networks, airmen can identify select groups operating within the larger overall system 
that are potentially more vulnerable to influence than others.130  To enable a process of 
selective targeting through focused influence measures, airmen must gain ethnographic 
information so as to decompose the enemy system into its constituent parts.  This 
decomposition of the enemy system can and should be accomplished from multiple 
perspectives.  By decomposing the insurgency on the basis of different classes of actors, 
                                                 
129 The author adapts Davis and Jenkins “Escalation Ladder of Coercive Influence” by incorporating 
the coercive airpower strategies of Mueller and Walker.  What remains is for airmen to use their 
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audience.  See Davis and Jenkins, 10. 
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the influences to which they are susceptible, the lifecycle through which they become 
active, and the ideology that underpins their values, airmen can begin to develop practical 
applications of influence.  The key to success is to avoid formulating generalities, and 
instead look for specific circumstances in which various influence strategies from Table 2 
could be brought to bear.131  Significantly, airmen should avoid trying to apply too 
narrow of a strategy designed to attack a center-of-gravity as vast and diverse as the 
population of the contested territory.  Instead, Davis and Jenkins advocate that airmen 
fight insurgents by developing a long-term, broad-front strategy employing a 
combination of inducements and coercion, or rather the carrot and stick.132 
C. PACIFICATION AND THE “OIL SPOT” 
Armed with a portfolio of influences, airmen must next develop a basic 
understanding of the classic pacification campaign.  By so doing, airmen can begin to 
understand how the theater commander mechanizes overall strategy for COIN, 
methodically employing state forces throughout the contested territory to expand state 
control within the disputed political space.  With this understanding, airmen can finally 
envision how the expeditionary Air Force might play a more substantial role in crushing 
the insurgents. 
At this point, it is necessary to define the concept of pacification so as to identify 
its key components.  According to Thompson, pacification is “an offensive campaign 
designed to restore the government’s authority by a sustained advance in accordance with 
national priority areas and, at the same time, to protect the individual against a selective 
reprisal attack so that he can safely play his part within the community, in cooperation 
with the government, against the [insurgents].”133  Breaking this down, then, pacification 
contains at least three principal components: (1) protecting the people; (2) restoring 
government control; and (3), addressing popular grievances. While the order of these 
steps may seem trivial, it really matters, for the government truly does not control anyone 
until it provides for elementary security.  As Krepinevich puts it, pacification focuses on 
providing security for the population precisely for the sake of winning their hearts and 
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minds.  Rather than trying to kill every insurgent through search-and-destroy tactics, it 
provides a rationale for the people to support the regime by concentrating on their 
protection and providing them with opportunities, thereby denying the insurgents their 
base of popular support, without which they cannot function.134 
Notably, pacification involves a steady advance into selected priority areas across 
the contested territory.  Starting where the government already enjoys significant popular 
support, the state solidifies its base areas by protecting the people through enhanced 
security and increasing programs for stabilization and reconstruction. While the latter 
rewards the local population’s loyalty to the state, the former generates the second order 
effects of lowering the security premium associated with expensive government projects, 
while ensuring that the benefits of such programs endure rather than being sabotaged by 
the insurgents.135  Largely based on French COIN practitioner Joseph Gallieni’s social 
and military strategy known as tache d’huille, this “oil spot” principle calls for a gradual 
expansion outward from government bases into selected peripheral areas.136 
Typically, the classic pacification campaign consists of a rolling effort organized 
around three distinct phases that occur separately, yet simultaneously, in different parts of 
the contested territory.  In the preparatory first phase, the state focuses on training, 
intelligence, and reforms targeted for a selected area.  While military advisors equip and 
train indigenous forces, civil affairs teams prepare to serve as the cadre for assisting 
indigenous authorities in civil and political matters.  During this phase, special police 
focus on human intelligence to exploit ethnographic terrain so as to penetrate the 
insurgent infrastructure and exploit sources of information.  Additionally, the government 
develops and implements political, social, and economic reforms to hit at underlying 
social grievances.  In the military second phase, state forces advance from out of the 
periphery of the government-controlled base into the areas selected for pacification.  
Here, they sweep the area of active insurgents using clear and hold tactics.  As 
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government control is reasserted, the state forces pass authority for control of the 
population to various police, paramilitary, and civil defense forces.  Finally, in the third 
and final stabilization phase, special police work with paramilitary and state forces to 
eliminate insurgent infrastructure, while local police maintain security so that civil affairs 
teams can work with local authorities to implement additional programs aimed at 
improving governance, health care, education, and political participation.  Essentially, 
pacification amounts to using a secure government base to expand state operations into a 
number of adjacent areas for the purpose of separating more insurgents from the populace 
while eliminating their infrastructure, and then consolidating state control by earning 
popular allegiance.137 
In implementing a classic pacification campaign, the state must judiciously 
employ all of its capabilities since the high demand for limited manpower and material 
creates serious competition for resources.  To facilitate effective command and control 
over widespread pacification efforts, operations must be distributed among a vast array of 
networked units.138  As Gallieni points out, pacification planners and individual units 
must conduct detailed cartographic and ethnographic analysis so that, to the maximum 
extent possible, the execution of pacification remains congruent with the preexisting 
social, political, and economic patterns of the population.139  Areas targeted for 
pacification must be selected with care so as not to overextend the state.  However, since 
the state simply cannot abandon lesser-contested regions lest the insurgents be given 
sanctuary, special operations forces must continually pressure such territory to garner 
intelligence and early warning.  In areas selected for imminent pacification, special police 
must penetrate the insurgent infrastructure to obtain the intelligence necessary to 
appropriately plan the effort.  Additionally, indigenous information services must 
construct and maintain databases to permit the sharing of vast quantities of intelligence 
and ethnographic information.  In lesser-contested areas, indigenous military forces with 
imbedded American advisers initiate offensive operations using clear and hold tactics to 
separate the insurgents from the population.  To delouse areas more infested with active 
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insurgents, larger units of general-purpose ground forces may be applied to the problem, 
as long as they are broken up into smaller formations, and subsequently dispersed for 
follow-on stabilization.  Once state control is firmly reestablished within a given area, 
national police must assume responsibility, and immediately begin training local police 
and paramilitary forces to assert state control.  Simultaneously, civil affairs teams must 
work with local civilian authorities to facilitate efficient governance, accelerate ongoing 
reforms, and increase political participation.  As always, special police must continue 
isolating and infiltrating insurgent cells in the newly pacified territory, gathering more 
actionable intelligence while recruiting local people to actively do the same.  To detect 
and fix insurgent incursions from adjacent areas not yet pacified, indigenous military 
forces must patrol the periphery.  When insurgent guerrillas are identified, mobile quick 
reaction forces must employ swarming tactics to fix and finish the insurgent menace 
before it can disappear into the underground.140  In the final analysis, the mechanization 
of pacification requires the use of both static and mobile forces.  While the former 
maintain responsibility for the collective area comprising the “oil spot” of pacification, 
the latter provide the capability to counter insurgent thrusts wherever they are 
encountered.141 
Although the execution of a classic pacification campaign may seem 
straightforward at first glance, the reality is that it is usually far more difficult to 
implement than this brief discussion might suggest.  As Baritz uncovers in her review of 
the American performance in Vietnam, several problems typically hamper American 
efforts in this regard.  First, to the degree that guerrilla attacks can incite an American 
reaction in kind, the risk of unintended consequences often generates more harm than 
good.  In the end, Americans must take heed of Galula’s admonition that the COIN 
practitioner must always take care not to antagonize the people, even if sparing the 
population means accepting greater personal risk.142   Second, because most members of 
the American military lack cultural and ideological awareness, the required capability to 
navigate diverse ethnographic terrain is usually quite limited.  Third, by tending to place 
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pacification under the aegis of the military, the temptation of trying to solve political 
problems with purely military solutions often translates into a failure to address the 
underlying social grievances.  As Komer observes, the reason for this is simple: “If you 
are going to get a program going, you are only going to be able to do it by stealing from 
the military.”143  Fourth, because the American military is, in fact, the world’s premier 
conventional military, it too often resorts to the inappropriate use of firepower over 
manpower in its own image and likeness.144  Finally, as Krepinevich notes, Americans 
lack suitable metrics by which to gage the overall progress of pacification, forcing 
leaders, quite literally, to muddle their way through it.145  For airmen with their 
traditional vision of the “kinetic kill,” their inability to translate influence upon the 
human condition increasingly obfuscates the assessment of effects already rendered, as 
well as the determination of those still needed.146  In the final analysis, the effective 
COIN practitioner will likely have to trade old-fashioned metrics such as body counts and 
target counts for more state-of-the-art market metrics that measure to what degree the 
supply of various COIN and insurgent activities satisfy their demand.147  
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Figure 1.   Initial “Oil Spot” of Pacification. 
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So given all of the above, how should airmen think about pacification at the 
strategic level?  Reference the initial “oil spot” of pacification in Figure 3.  Here, an 
insurgency has emerged in the predominantly urban areas of the southwestern region of a 
notional state, as indicated by the lightly shaded region.   The state, with its capital city in 
the east and several other major urban areas strung out across the northern half of the 
territory, possesses the loyalty and allegiance of a substantial percentage of the 
population, as is to be expected.  Since this dark “oil spot” on the territory comprises the 
state’s initial base area, police and military forces immediately move to assert 
government control throughout, while the air force establishes airbases at six of ten 
airfields which reside within the base area.  Around each of these airbases, the air force 
establishes an airbase defense zone, within which the expeditionary airbase commander 
retains sole authority and responsibility for security and stabilization, or in other words, 
pacification.  As the state consolidates its control of the population within this base area, 
it selects and prepares particular areas adjacent to the oil spot for further pacification.  
Subsequently, special police and military forces invest those areas, such that over time, 
the oil spot of pacification expands to consume greater quantities of both the contested 
territory and the disputed political space.  Of course, while the state consolidates and 
expands its base, the insurgents do the same thing.  What is key for both is to expand the 
base, as rapidly as possible.  Thus, after some protracted period of time, the situation 
evolves to such an extent that most of the contested territory is consumed by either the 
expanded oil spot of pacification or the insurgency itself, as indicated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 2.   Expanded “Oil Spot” of Pacification. 
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As the expanding oil spot begins to come into contact with those areas most 
contested by the insurgency, the struggle between the insurgents and the state becomes 
more direct in nature.  However, since the state does not possess sufficient resources to 
be everywhere at once, less contested or neutral zones without urban areas or airfields 
must remain unoccupied, particularly in those portions of the territory where the 
insurgency does not threaten.  As previously mentioned, special operations forces may 
periodically apply pressure here, but they principally focus on investing those areas 
selected for imminent pacification—areas in the southwestern portion of the state either 
bordering or within the contested territory.  Although airfields in lesser-contested areas 
provide tempting potential airbases, the air force refrains from moving in prematurely 
until such time as active insurgents operating in the adjacent areas have been successfully 
routed.  Of the two airfields in the south central portion of the state’s lesser-contested 
territory, the western most will likely be the next to be pacified since military forces are 
already invested there.  As for the eastern most, until adjacent areas are less contested, it 
should best be avoided.  Thus, airmen can see from this notional example how the oil 
spot of pacification slowly expands to consume the entire contested territory. 
So what are the principal takeaways for airmen regarding a classic pacification 
campaign?  First, to maximize adaptability so as to win what Steven Metz and Raymond 
Millen call the “learning contest,” the state must employ its police and military forces 
using “a networked structure with central coordination but local autonomy.”148  In other 
words, by deploying static forces into selected small areas across the territory, 
decentralized execution of distributed operations at the local level provides individual 
commanders with sufficient authority and responsibility to do what must be done to 
pacify their portion of the larger contested territory.149  Thus, apart from providing initial 
direction, updated guidance, and requested logistics, higher authorities should stay out of 
the fight to the maximum extent possible.  Second, state forces must move rapidly to 
consolidate their base by securing those areas that enjoy significant popular support.  By 
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so doing, the state allows the oil spot to set fast in the fabric of society.  Third, all other 
things being equal, the state should select priority areas for pacification based on the 
potential sources of strength that come from occupying the selected territory.  Consistent 
with this concept, airmen should seek to establish airbases in those areas that are state 
controlled, neutral, or less contested, in order of priority, so as to permit the most 
unfettered air operations.  If the choice comes down to two airfields in areas equally 
contested, then airmen should consider which one is more populated or less threatened by 
adjacent contested territory.  Fourth, with respect to expanding the oil spot, state forces 
should proceed by the path of least resistance.  Metaphorically, as the waters of state 
control fill the disputed political space from the bottom up, the islands of insurgency 
slowly shrink until such time as they are overwhelmed and disappear altogether.  Finally, 
since airmen best understand all that is required to deliver unfettered air operations, the 
airman that serves as the airbase commander should also serve as the ground commander 
for that portion of the territory comprising the airbase defense zone.150  In accordance 
with the concept of distributed operations, the airbase commander should therefore 
possess all authority and responsibility for pacification efforts within his designated area.  
So if this is the case with COIN in classic pacification, then the prudent airman must next 
ponder how best to shape the expeditionary Air Force so as to deliver appropriate 
capabilities to future airbase commanders.  
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IV. SHAPING THE EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE  
If expeditionary airbase commanders are to assume authority and responsibility 
for pacification in those zones containing their respective airbases, then airmen must find 
better ways and means to control the population, dismantle enemy infrastructure, and 
counter the enemy force.  To meet the challenges posed by insurgent warfare, the Air 
Force must seek more human solutions to what are inherently human problems.  
Fortunately, by leveraging the intrinsic capabilities of its own human capital, the Air 
Force can develop and deploy expeditionary airpower constructed on the strong 
foundation of aviation advisors, security forces, and civil affairs airmen.  In so doing, 
airmen could significantly improve the efficacy of airpower in COIN by shaping the 
expeditionary Air Force to play its rightful role in campaigns of pacification. 
A. AVIATION ADVISORS  
The first of three ways in which the Air Force can harness the power of airmen for 
insurgent warfare is to bolster its current cadre of aviation advisors.  While COIN may 
belong primarily to the realm of ground forces, the historical record clearly demonstrates 
that airpower will play a role in almost every bout with insurgents, albeit in a mostly 
supporting capacity.  Since many developing states faced with insurgency need and want 
airpower capabilities—surveillance, airlift, and close air support—that they do not 
already possess, the expeditionary Air Force can and should seize upon the opportunity to 
build partnering relationships so as to help them meet that end.  Additionally, since 
traditional airpower roles will likely be of limited value in the struggle for legitimacy, 
aviation advisors can help indigenous air forces tailor their existing capabilities to assist 
their respective governments in administering state control, both politically and 
militarily.151  In order to accomplish these two broad functions, as David Dean notes, 
aviation advisors will execute their missions at three different levels of activity: 
assistance in non-combat training; integration with ongoing air operations; and direct 
intervention for foreign internal defense.152 
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According to Wray Johnson, the Air Force has developed its aviation advisors as 
a “total package” concept combining security assistance with adaptive “in-country” 
training to advise, train, and assist foreign air forces in the employment and sustainment 
of air operations.153  Addressing the “totality of airpower,” detachments of aviation 
advisors comprise an effective team of airmen from across various specialties, to include 
one or more of the following: operations, maintenance, logistics, munitions, life support, 
safety, airbase defense, medical, command and control, and airfield management.154  To 
prepare aviation advisors to work with indigenous forces during COIN, education and 
training focuses on irregular warfare, foreign internal defense, intercultural 
communications, psychological operations, and a strategic foreign language applicable to 
a specific region.  Additionally, as William Downs notes, aviation advisors must develop 
intimate familiarity with local people and culture.155  Ultimately, aviation advisors 
provide the expeditionary Air Force with a cadre of politico-military professionals who 
are both culturally and politically astute enough to contribute to insurgent warfare.156 
So how does an enhanced cadre of aviation advisors help improve the efficacy of 
airpower in COIN?  As one study by RAND lays it out, aviation advisors perform a 
number of functions that help the Air Force meet insurgency’s challenges for airpower.  
First, by deploying into the contested territory for foreign internal defense, aviation 
advisors help develop understanding of a particular insurgency by gaining an insider’s 
perspective of the partner state’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of the 
insurgents.157  Additionally, as first arrivers into the contested territory, aviation advisors 
effectively open the door for subsequent packages of more substantial airpower, thereby 
helping the larger Air Force secure its access to the fight.  Because aviation advisors 
operating “in-country” can observe the partner state’s most pressing needs, they can 
synchronize assistance and cooperation to ensure that bilateral relationships remain 
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healthy.158  To the degree that this is successfully accomplished, aviation advisors can 
continue to work through, by and with indigenous air forces to achieve a common set of 
objectives.   As Dean emphasizes, aviation advisors often make their greatest in-roads 
into the disputed political space by executing various civil affairs projects to improve 
local conditions throughout the contested territory.159  Clearly, aviation advisors have 
their biggest impact by building state capacity in the following to ways.  Politically, 
through their own professional example, aviation advisors inculcate indigenous military 
forces with a profound respect for the judicious application of military force in 
accordance with accepted legal authority.  Militarily, they improve indigenous military 
forces by not only improving tactical and operational competence, but also by cultivating 
an appreciation for the more appropriate methods afforded by using the indirect 
approach.160  Finally, by leading professional discourse on the important topic of 
insurgent warfare and helping to develop cultural awareness applicable to theaters rife 
with insurgency, aviation advisors help posture the expeditionary Air Force to fulfill its 
potential role in classic pacification.161 
While Air Force Special Operations Command already maintains a cadre of 
aviation advisors in the 6th Special Operations Squadron, as Downs laments, the Air 
Force has too often left the training, advising, and assisting of foreign air forces to other 
less appropriate personnel, such as contractors.162  If the use of specially trained advisors 
really does mark a COIN best practice, as Kalev Sepp asserts, then Air Force aviation 
advisors ought to lead the way to the degree that airpower capabilities need to be 
developed for application in a foreign contested territory.163  Thus, the Air Force needs to 
bolster this select cadre of airmen, and then deploy them to the contested territory at the 
earliest opportunity.  By so doing, the expeditionary Air Force gains better understanding 
through greater access; additionally, it helps occupy the disputed political space more 
appropriately, while enhancing state capacity to defeat the insurgents with legitimacy. 
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B. SECURITY FORCES 
The second way in which the Air Force can harness the power of airmen for 
COIN is to continue building up of its own security forces while developing and evolving 
better concepts of operation for airbase defense.  To the degree that success in COIN 
depends upon operations through, by, and with local people—where they reside at ground 
level—then security forces, practicing law enforcement techniques, likely represent the 
best potential capability for expeditionary airpower to play a more direct role in classic 
pacification.164 
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, the American military has 
found itself deployed to numerous austere locations for all sorts of operations.  To the 
extent that airpower has played a role, the expeditionary Air Force has deployed airmen 
to support air operations at expeditionary airbases throughout the contested territory.  
Consisting of relatively large airfields located near urban centers of population, these 
expeditionary airbases—with all their airmen, aircraft, and logistics—have rapidly 
emerged as primary targets for insurgents hoping to undermine American credibility and 
commitment.  In fact, since the outset of hostilities in Iraq over three years ago, the 
number of standoff attacks against American airbases has now surpassed 1500.165 
But can more and better security forces really stop such attacks, or would it not be 
better to just focus on using the most lethal means available to kill every potential 
insurgent?  On the basis of his experiences in Algeria, Galula provides a well-informed 
opinion when he observes that since “the insurgent does not hesitate to use terror, the 
counterinsurgent [must] engage in police work.”166  But as Searle cautions, military 
forces typically make poor policemen for several different reasons.  Not only do they lack 
the investigative skills required to track down insurgents, they also rely heavily on 
coercive tactics, too often intimidating local populations, and thereby limiting the flow of 
information.  To make matters worse, when military forces do counterattack, the lack of  
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actionable intelligence coupled with heavy weapons only serves to exacerbate an already 
difficult situation by often producing unintended casualties and excessive collateral 
damage.167 
Fortunately, forward-thinking airmen in the security forces have already begun 
developing new ways to not only protect expeditionary airbases, but to also influence the 
overall COIN effort.  In his thesis on the topic, David Young outlines an innovative 
approach to airbase security that neatly folds into the concept of classic pacification.   
Calling for persistent airbase defense “outside the wire,” Young advocates coupling 
traditional law enforcement techniques with precision firepower to find, fix, and finish 
insurgents within a civil-military context.  Based on controlling the population, 
dismantling enemy infrastructure, and countering the enemy force, this new approach 
relies on the following five principles: act first, unity of effort, protection, penetration, 
and perseverance.168   By briefly analyzing each of these in light of insurgency’s 
challenges for airpower, one can rapidly see how security forces provide one of 
expeditionary airpower’s best answers to the insurgents. 
Security forces “act first” in two distinctive ways.  First, to the degree that they 
assist beddown planning for expeditionary airpower, they help select airfields in lesser-
contested areas so as to maximize the effectiveness of future airbase operations.  In 
addition to determining which airfields to use as airbases, security forces also help 
determine the boundaries of airbase defense zones by outlining the security requirements 
for all of the selected airfields.169  Second, by deploying to the expeditionary airbase at 
the earliest opportunity, but no later than the first arrival of aircraft, security forces 
proactively establish security throughout the airbase defense zone.  By so doing, security 
forces seize the initiative, thereby denying the insurgents the opportunity of an 
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unopposed first attack.  In any case, the proactive early action of security forces generates 
a two-fold effect.  First, by mitigating risks it allows commanders to assume risks 
smartly, thereby increasing airpower’s access into theater.  Second, to the degree that 
security forces early action preempts the insurgent threat, it builds state capacity by 
enabling unfettered air operations from the outset of operations. 
Possessing the most stringent security concerns of anyone operating within the 
airbase defense zone, the airbase commander rightfully serves as the overall zone 
commander.170  To create unity of effort, the airbase commander establishes common 
security objectives in coordination with local civilian authorities.  Then, to meet these 
objectives, security forces meld with local indigenous police and paramilitary forces to 
form one cohesive team.171  To the degree that this cohesion produces a collective effort 
for local security within the surrounding community, the information sharing and 
combined operations that come with that effort all serve to increase bilateral 
understanding.  Additionally, by ensuring that all components are operating as one 
distributed team, unity of effort secures a more effective occupation of the disputed 
political space by the airbase security team. 
To ensure protection across the breadth and depth of the local community, 
security forces maximize presence across the airbase defense zone by dispersing 
numerous small teams for distributed operations.  By sending security forces outside the 
wire and into the local community, the expansion of their operational terrain not only 
increases their freedom of action in the physical sense, but also in the informational and 
moral realms, thereby reducing the insurgents’ freedom of action by a corresponding 
amount.172  This persistent presence of “law enforcement officers” walking their beat 
effectively separates the insurgents from the population.  Additionally, the constant 
image of security forces moving about the local community solidifies state control 
through a benevolent occupation of the disputed political space.  To the degree that 
protection prevents or reduces insurgent attacks, it also guards the soft underbelly of 
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negative public opinion.173  Finally, by training and advising indigenous police and 
paramilitary forces to execute security operations with due regard for the civil-military 
environment, security forces also help build state capacity.   
To penetrate the insurgent underground, security forces use investigative police 
techniques such as social network analysis and undercover surveillance.  By identifying 
the weakest links in various insurgent networks, security forces can either exploit the 
insurgency for additional information, or isolate the insurgents from the support of the 
population.174  Either way, working through, by, and with co-opted indigenous police and 
paramilitary forces, security forces slowly dismantle insurgent infrastructure to generate a 
three-fold, compounding effect.  First, by cultivating and exploiting additional sources of 
information through human interaction, security forces produce actionable intelligence by 
finding and fixing the insurgents.  Second, actionable intelligence enables security forces 
to use swarming tactics in concert with discriminate force to finish the known insurgents.  
Finally, by accomplishing the first two steps above, security forces remove popular fear 
of insurgent reprisal thereby producing increasing sources of information and less 
resistance to the state’s control of the population. 
The perseverance of security forces helps achieve moral authority by 
demonstrating to the local population that American airmen “protect” for the benefit of 
the people.  By committing to the long-term security of not only the airbase, but its 
surrounding community as well, perseverance sends the message that American airmen 
will not be outlasted.175  Thus, through the application of constant pressure, perseverance 
enables airmen to occupy the disputed political space more thoroughly over time, thereby 
shrinking the insurgency through a slow constriction of its operational terrain. 
To enable the security forces to assume their prominent role in pacification, the 
expeditionary Air Force must immediately take the following three steps.  First, to enable 
the security forces to move beyond the perimeter and out into the community so as to 
occupy the disputed political space, more personnel must be trained and equipped.  
Simultaneously, the Air Force must find more effective ways and means to maximize the                                                  
173 Young, 101. 
174 Young, 102. 
175 Young, 103. 
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influence of the forces made available.  Second, airmen must be empowered to solve 
local problems with local civilian authorities; therefore, the Air Force must decentralize 
command and control while simultaneously pushing distributed operations.  Third, to 
permit security forces to effectively partner with local indigenous police and paramilitary 
forces, assigned airmen must receive appropriate language skills and cultural awareness 
training. 
In the end, as Sepp asserts, “the intelligence operations that help detect terrorist 
insurgents for arrest and prosecution are the single most important practice protecting the 
population from threats to its security.”  Combined with population-control measures that 
normal law enforcement officers regularly implement, these actions of security forces 
represent two of the best practices in COIN.176  Thus, as Young claims, it is the security 
forces’ focus on law enforcement techniques that makes them better suited for 
pacification than any other military force, apart from special operations forces.  As long 
as they keep this in mind and avoid the temptation of becoming just another conventional 
ground force, security forces really do represent expeditionary airpower’s most 
significant contribution to COIN in the twenty-first century. 
C. CIVIL AFFAIRS AIRMEN 
The final way in which the Air Force can harness the power of airmen for 
pacification is to establish and train its own cadre of civil affairs airmen.  Currently, the 
Air Force possesses no capability for civil-military operations; instead, it relies on the 
Army to make civil affairs teams available when the Air Force thinks it needs them.  
Herein lies the problem.  Many airmen see civil-military operations as the responsibility 
of ground forces, and since they are airmen they should not be concerned.177  This, 
however, denies the fact that all air operations start and stop at some place on terra firma, 
usually at an expeditionary airbase commanded by an airman and located in or near an 
urban area, with a substantial local populace residing just outside the wire.  Thus, like it 
or not, civil-military operations will occur, and airbase commanders will be responsible.  
                                                 
176 Sepp, 9. 
177 In the following statement, Searle provides a great example of the typical airman’s attitude toward 
civil affairs. “Ground forces naturally take the lead in civil affairs projects and sorting good-guys from bad-
guys, and airpower seems to have only a supporting role.”  See Thomas R. Searle, “Rediscovering Air-
centric Counter Insurgency,” Quick-Look 04-14; online at http://research.airuniv.edu; accessed 6 June 2006 
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If the need for unfettered air operations fails to motivate airmen to work civil-military 
operations so as to pacify the area around the airbase, then perhaps sufficient motivation 
could be found in the fact that two of Sepp’s best practices in COIN lie in the realm of 
civil-military operations.  By building state capacity to ensure that the populace gets life-
sustaining essentials considered basic human rights, and by encouraging popular 
participation in the local political process, civil-military operations could help 
expeditionary airpower successfully complete the occupation of the disputed political 
space at least in local communities adjacent to expeditionary airbases.178  But what 
exactly are civil military operations? 
Interestingly enough, civil-military operations are defined as “activities of a 
commander.”  Thus, they explicitly belong to the realm of that individual responsible for 
pacification within the airbase defense zone.  Notably, civil-military operations establish, 
maintain, influence, and exploit relations between military forces and the civilians 
segments of society in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area so as to facilitate military 
operations for the purpose of achieving American objectives in peace or war.179  Thus, to 
facilitate unfettered air operations, civil affairs airmen would work through, by, and with 
the local civilian authorities to provide population and resource control, foreign 
humanitarian assistance, civilian information management, nation assistance, and support 
to civil administration.180 
Through stabilization and reconstruction, civil affairs airmen could help sustain 
the security of local people so as to permit more effective control of the population, and 
the resources that flow from it.  Thus, by appealing to the hearts-and-minds of indigenous 
people, civil affairs airmen could complete the isolation of insurgents from the people.  
By partnering expeditionary airpower with local civil authorities, civil affairs airmen 
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could help promote the rule of law, economic stability, governance, health and welfare, 
infrastructure, education, and public information.181 
So how does creating a cadre of civil affairs airmen help address insurgency’s 
challenges for airpower?  First, by working through, by, and with local civilian 
authorities to solve human problems for real people, civil affairs airmen could 
significantly promote understanding of benevolent American interests among the 
population.  To the degree that successful civil-military operations would precede and 
enable the deployment of expeditionary airpower, then civil military airmen could also 
help assure airpower’s access to the fight.  Second, through population and resource 
control as well as civil information management, and more importantly, by improving the 
lives of native people primarily through foreign humanitarian assistance, civil affairs 
airmen could make great strides in advancing the occupation of the disputed political 
space.  Third, through nation assistance and support to civil administration, civil affairs 
airmen could help build sufficient state capacity so that the people of the contested 
territory would cast their lot in with the government, effectively defeating the insurgency.  
Finally, because civil affairs airmen would have to be skilled administrators with focused 
cultural awareness and language capability, they would significantly help posture the 
expeditionary Air Force for its newly expanded role influencing people during COIN, 
and more particularly, through pacification. 
Clearly, civil affairs airmen could take the lead in many aspects of COIN by 
leveraging all human and material resources to help local government meet the needs of 
native people.  By supporting the efforts of civilians to create conditions for long-term 
security and prosperity so as to render those areas inhospitable to insurgents, civil affairs 
airmen represent the unrealized third component in a triad of airmen poised for COIN and 
pacification.182  Ultimately, the expeditionary Air Force must remember what Cordesman 
notes in his lessons from Iraq.  Insurgent warfare “is as much political as it is military.  
Thus, it requires political action, aid in governance, economic development, and attention 
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to the ideological and political dimension.”183  If the Air Force really intends to get 
serious about COIN, then it needs to get serious about civil affairs, too. 
As the recent actions by Hezbollah in its war with Israel indicate, the enemy has 
learned this lesson well. 
Using the grass-roots program, Hezbollah has been able to convert the 
ignored and the disposed Shiite underclass of southern Lebanon into a 
powerful lever in regional politics.  It understands that the basic need in 
any human conflict, whether or not it involves physical violence, is to take 
care of one’s political base before striking out at the opponent…. One 
must be willing to work in the underbelly of local politics, as Hezbollah 
has done in Lebanon.  It is the politics of getting people jobs, picking up 
trash and getting relatives out of jail.  Engaging in this politics has the 
potential to do much more than merely ingratiate an armed force with a 
local population.184 
So what actions must the Air Force take to get civil affairs airmen into the fight?  
First, it must immediately stand up its own civil affairs program and associated specialty.  
To implement such a program, the Air Force should quite literally steal from the Army 
since their program is time-tested and combat proven.  The only changes the Air Force 
might need to make would be to tailor the size of its civil affairs cadre and some of the 
specific operational concepts to support civil military operations around expeditionary 
airbases.  Second, the Air Force must find the personnel to train and equip.  Although 
current reductions in overall force strength will likely generate resistance to any new 
requirement, one solution might be to create civil affairs authorizations in the Air Force 
Reserve.  Third, as personnel are received, the Air Force must develop an organizational 
structure that delivers regional focus while retaining maximum flexibility.  Fourth, the 
Air Force must find effective ways to train civil affairs airmen for their new 
responsibilities.  To minimize cost and maximize interoperability, the best solution 
probably is to train them with the Army.  Finally, to prepare civil affairs airmen for 
operations in specific areas, cultural awareness and language training would need to be 
provided.  Although the creation of civil affairs airmen seems like a huge investment, the  
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reality is that in COIN it is only hedging one’s bet.  And let there be no doubt, the stakes 
are very high.  As Hoffman warns, “ignoring the civil side of COIN… [is like] playing 
chess while the enemy is playing poker.185 
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V. AIRMEN IN PACIFICATION  
When it comes to the application of airpower in COIN, airmen remain amazingly 
aloof due to their own air-centric perspective.  They typically do not think much about 
pacification, because to a great degree, it is and always has been associated with ground 
forces.  Moreover, since insurgent warfare is short on targets and long on humanity, the 
struggle presents few opportunities for airmen to use real-time targeting and standoff 
precision firepower to showcase airpower’s newfound strategic decisiveness.  Since 
traditional airpower only seems to impact COIN on the margins, airmen intellectually 
detach themselves from the fight, content to loiter high above the fray, offering little 
more than more of the same—taking pictures, hauling cargo, and delivering firepower to 
anyone on the ground, and in the fight, who might have an urgent request that they can 
answer. 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
In reality, the air-centric perspective denies the experience of expeditionary 
airpower in COIN.  The fact is, as plainly demonstrated by the historical record, that 
airpower will play a substantial role in any American effort to thwart insurgents, albeit in 
a mostly supporting capacity.  Consequently, in order to provide those ground forces 
principally engaged with the most responsive and effective support possible, the 
expeditionary Air Force will most assuredly deploy en masse to numerous airfields across 
the contested territory.  As these airfields rapidly transform into expeditionary airbases 
with the arrival of American airmen, the airbase commander will necessarily establish an 
airbase defense zone to protect American lives, property, and interests.  Since these 
airbases will most often exist in largely urban areas, the surrounding local communities 
will present both a challenge and an opportunity.  Clearly, American airbases—with their 
high-dollar aircraft, permanent facilities, storehouses of supplies, and concentrations of 
humanity—will present a tremendous security challenge as insurgents seek to capitalize 
on their value as lucrative targets.  But just as clearly, the surrounding community will 
present an opportunity for airmen to contribute to COIN more directly—on the ground, 
outside the perimeter, and among the populace.  And it’s not as if airmen will not be there 
already. With an airbase defense zone extending from the airfield environment to a 
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distance equal to the maximum range of the insurgents’ indirect fire systems, some force 
will have to occupy that zone, and someone will have to command that force.  With the 
airfield environment driving security requirements, the airbase commander will rightly 
assume responsibility and authority for ensuring that security is established throughout 
the zone.  Since local authorities will maintain a vested interest in what goes on in the 
airbase security zone, the airbase commander will establish his objectives and develop his 
plan in coordination with local authorities.  To execute that plan, the airbase commander 
will rely on deployed airmen to fashion an airbase security team with indigenous police 
and paramilitary forces.  Working together for common objectives, this team will control 
the population, dismantle insurgent infrastructure, and counter the insurgents.  By 
employing a portfolio of influences within the context of pacification, airmen working 
through, by, and with the local people will not only secure the airbase, but more 
importantly, they will provide protection for the populace.  As the wellbeing of local 
people translates into greater legitimacy for the state, the populace will increasingly 
provide information on the illegal activities of insurgents.  So armed with information 
and a legitimate claim to the use of force, the airbase security team will complete the 
insurgents’ demise.  To enable airbase commanders to execute pacification to the limits 
of their authority, the expeditionary Air Force must rely on a three-legged triad of airmen 
employing aviation advisors, security forces, and civil affairs airmen to meet and beat the 
insurgents’ challenges for airpower. 
As the vanguard of expeditionary airpower, aviation advisors build relationships 
with indigenous forces, thereby improving access into theater while furthering bilateral 
understanding.  Working through, by, and with indigenous air forces, they primarily build 
state capacity, ultimately legitimizing the state’s use of force to quell the insurgency. 
With the arrival of the expeditionary Air Force into the contested territory, 
security forces work hand-in-hand with indigenous police and paramilitary forces beyond 
the perimeter and within the community.  Dispersing into a distributed network of small 
patrols, these airmen work the beat to control the population at ground level.  By 




dismantle insurgent infrastructure.  As local citizens increasingly become credible 
sources of actionable intelligence, security forces swarm the insurgents to finish the 
insurgency. 
In concert with these efforts, newly minted teams of civil affairs airmen provide 
stabilization and reconstruction within the contested territory.  Working through, by, and 
with civil authorities on behalf of the airbase commander, civil affairs airmen build 
sufficient state capacity to ensure that expeditionary airpower not only defeats the 
insurgency, but also wins the peace. 
B. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 
While the greatest benefit of expeditionary airpower in COIN is, no doubt, its 
direct contribution to pacification, the focus on airmen waging COIN at the intrastate 
level also produces several additional benefits that are not intuitively obvious. 
1. Economy of Force 
The use of security forces and civil affairs airman to secure airbase defense zones 
during pacification generates an economy of force that permits general-purpose ground 
forces to quell insurgency in the more contested areas.  Due to current commitments in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, general-purpose ground forces will be stretched thin for the 
foreseeable future.186  By choosing airfields in lesser-contested areas to be expeditionary 
airbases in accordance with classic pacification, force requirements for the security of 
airbase defense zones could be greatly reduced, thereby permitting security forces and 
civil affairs airmen to provide all the protection that is required.  Where general-purpose 
ground forces already accomplish this function, the use of airmen would release these 
forces to perform COIN in the more contested areas.  This would also permit airmen 
serving in undermanned Army specialties to be returned for service with the 
expeditionary Air Force.187 
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2. Strategic Leaders 
The operational experience of leading airmen during pacification provides future 
strategic leaders with the competence and agility to lead future Joint forces tasked for 
COIN.  The principal reason airmen remain aloof with respect to COIN is that so few Air 
Force leaders, and even fewer midlevel officers, truly understand the nature of insurgent 
warfare.  Although many have studied insurgency and COIN during their developmental 
education, most lack any real world experience trying to either control the population or 
dismantle insurgent infrastructure.  By leading security forces and civil affairs airmen for 
COIN at the intrastate level, senior and midlevel officers gain invaluable exposure to 
combat decision-making in the civil-military context.  Additionally, in their capacity as 
advisors to senior officers of indigenous air forces, aviation advisors gain the insider’s 
perspective on strategic decision-making. 
3. More Effective Airpower 
Successful pacification of the airbase defense zone renders the execution of 
traditional airpower more effective.  To the degree that airmen can control the population 
and dismantle the insurgent infrastructure, they gain the intelligence to eliminate the 
insurgents.  In the final analysis, the efficiency of air operations at the expeditionary 
airbase improves in direct correlation to the decline of insurgent activity within the 
airbase defense zone.  Additionally, through their active participation in the overall 
pacification effort, airmen gain invaluable experience and insight into the nuances of the 
insurgency.  By applying this increased awareness across the more traditional airpower 
roles and missions, it follows that airpower’s support of other forces in the more 
contested zones will also improve. 
4. Capabilities-Based Air Force 
Investing in the human capital of its own airmen to improve COIN capabilities 
allows the Air Force to truly develop a capabilities-based Air Force which is at once 
more ready to fight the insurgent threat but still dominant in the conventional arena.  
Because insurgent warfare is a human contest it requires a human solution.  From the 
airman’ perspective, however, that solution does not need to be applied everywhere, but 
rather only where the expeditionary Air Force maintains a substantial in-theater 
presence—at the expeditionary airbase.  Thus, the investment in additional security 
71 
forces and civil affairs airman must be tailored such that it provides only that capability 
which might be required to support air operations in some nominal insurgency.  Taking 
Iraq, for example, the Air Force could look at how many expeditionary airbases it 
maintains within the contested territory, then determine the required security forces and 
civil affairs capabilities on the basis of accomplishing pacification for that number of 
airbase defense zones.  With respect to aviation advisors, the Air Force should look at the 
6th Special Operations Squadron’s ability to meet or exceed the demand for such 
capability, and then adjust the supply as required.  Because personnel cost are always 
exorbitant, additional personnel requirements should be paid by shifting personnel from 
other specialties.  With respect to executing such an option, clearly, the devil would be in 
the details. 
Perhaps the greatest benefit of developing COIN capability through an 
appropriate investment in human capital is that it allows the Air Force to continue 
capitalizing its conventional capabilities according to its current roadmap.  Since these 
capabilities are already applied to COIN fairly well, albeit in a mostly supporting 
capacity, the logic goes that the Air Force should not fix what is not broken.  The fact of 
the matter is that because insurgent warfare, particularly at the intrastate level, is a largely 
human affair, there are simply limits to what traditional airpower can do, and that no 
amount of investment in advanced technology can overcome that fact.  Thus, the 
expeditionary Air Force must not try to build a fleet of aircraft optimized for COIN, but 
rather should continue investing to preserve its current dominance in conventional 
warfare.  As Lambeth notes, this dominance, wrought by stealth, precision, and 
information technology, finally permits airpower to deliver on the airman’s promise of 
strategic decisiveness, but in ways not envisioned by the early advocates of strategic 
attack.188  Instead of trying to defeat an enemy by attacking vital centers so as to destroy 
both the ability and will to resist, modern airpower produces a strategic decision by 
destroying the enemy’s fielded conventional military forces as the precursor to strategic 
victory.189   
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C. CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, but for a small additional investment in the human capital of 
its own airmen, the Air Force needs to change little with respect to achieving its desired 
future capabilities.  By so doing, the Air Force not only preserves its newfound ability to 
be strategically decisive against any fielded military force challenging America in 
conventional warfare, but by applying airmen to the problems of insurgent warfare, it 
also achieves greater efficacy in COIN, and, therefore, greater strategic relevance through 
its contributions to classic pacification.  By ensuring that its airmen understand the nature 
of insurgent warfare, and then shaping expeditionary airpower in COIN so that those 
airmen can influence indigenous people, the Air Force can assure its continued relevance 
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